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When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults 
Lauren E. Willis† 
Inspired by the success of “automatic enrollment” in increasing participation 
in defined contribution retirement savings plans, policymakers have put similar 
policy defaults in place in a variety of other contexts, from checking account over-
draft coverage to home-mortgage escrows. Internet privacy appears poised to be the 
next arena. But how broadly applicable are the results obtained in the retirement-
savings context? Evidence from other contexts indicates two problems with this ap-
proach: the defaults put in place by the law are not always sticky, and the people 
who opt out may be those who would benefit the most from the default. Examining 
the new default for consumer checking account overdraft coverage reveals that 
firms can systematically undermine each of the mechanisms that might otherwise 
operate to make defaults sticky. Comparing the retirement-savings default to the 
overdraft default, four boundary conditions on the use of defaults as a policy tool 
are apparent: policy defaults will not be sticky when (1) motivated firms oppose 
them, (2) these firms have access to the consumer, (3) consumers find the decision 
environment confusing, and (4) consumer preferences are uncertain. Due to consti-
tutional and institutional constraints, government regulation of the libertari-
an-paternalism variety is unlikely to be capable of overcoming these bounds. 
Therefore, policy defaults intended to protect individuals when firms have the mo-
tivation and means to move consumers out of the default are unlikely to be effective 
unless accompanied by substantive regulation. Moreover, the same is likely to be 
true of “nudges” more generally, when motivated firms oppose them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Nudging”—framing people’s choices so as to channel them 
to better outcomes without substantively limiting choice—is all 
the rage,1 and perhaps the most popular framing tool is the use 
of policy defaults.2 Defaults are settings or rules about the way 
products, policies, or legal relationships function that apply un-
less users, affected citizens, or parties take action to change 
them. Default rules are ubiquitous in the law: intestacy rules 
that can be overridden by a will, marital property rules that can 
be overridden by a prenuptial agreement, and gap-filling con-
tract rules that can be overridden by explicit contract language 
are common examples. But these have largely been put in place 
because the law needs some rule when the parties have not spec-
ified otherwise, rather than with an explicit purpose to alter the 
ultimate position of the parties. Although many of these defaults 
are sticky,3 that is not their goal. Policy defaults, in contrast, 
aim for stickiness.4 The idea is to set the default to a position 
that is good for most individuals, under the assumption that on-
ly the minority who have clear preferences to the contrary will 
opt out.5 The magnetism of defaults is believed to be so strong 
 
  1  See Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 6 (Yale 2008).  
  2  “Policy defaults” are defaults put in place by regulators with the explicit goal of 
increasing the number of people in the default position. See Craig R.M. McKenzie, Mi-
chael J. Liersch, and Stacey R. Finkelstein, Recommendations Implicit in Policy De-
faults, 17 Psych Sci 414, 414 (2006).  
  3  See, for example, Omri Ben-Shahar and John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of 
Default Rules, 33 Fla St U L Rev 651, 670–81 (2006) (providing examples of situations in 
which default rules are sticky, including revocability of offers and the duration of em-
ployment contracts); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: 
The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 Vand L Rev 1583, 1587–
88 (1998) (explaining that, even in the absence of high transaction costs, the “initial allo-
cation of legal entitlements can affect preferences for those entitlements”). By “sticky,” I 
mean that more people stay in that position than would were it not the default. A “slip-
pery” default is a default that is not sticky, or is less sticky than it was intended to be. 
  4  When another party has interests contrary to the default, policy defaults might 
also be characterized as “penalty defaults” from the point of view of that other party. 
However, the term “penalty defaults” refers to default rules that one or more parties dis-
like, placed in the law with the aim that the parties would contract around the default. 
Penalty defaults aim not to be sticky, but to force information revelation and negotiation. 
See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 Yale L J 
2032, 2087 (2012). 
  5  Some proponents emphasize that nudges help people choose what is best for 
themselves, whereas others emphasize that nudges should encourage people to choose 
what is best for society (for example, increased organ donation rates). See, for example, 
Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 Cal L Rev 1651, 1653 (2009). This article  
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that it has been called the “iron law of default inertia.”6 Ulti-
mately, nudgers (or “libertarian paternalists”7) claim that de-
faults and other nudges can easily8 and at low cost9 “solve many 
of society’s major problems . . . while still insisting on everyone’s 
freedom to choose.”10 Unsurprisingly, helping people while dodg-
ing the politically perilous explicit tradeoffs and normative 
judgment calls inherent in substantive regulation is popular 
with policymakers and academics alike. 
The most celebrated, and most cited, example of a policy de-
fault is in the area of retirement saving. Although most US em-
ployers that offer defined contribution plans wait for employees 
to sign up on their own, some employers now make participation 
the default. Employers that have adopted this change in the de-
fault rule, commonly called “automatic enrollment,” have in-
creased their employee participation rates dramatically. One 
study found over 85 percent of new hires were participating, 
nearly double the participation rate before the default was im-
plemented.11 The increase has been largest for lower-income con-
sumers, which has been interpreted as evidence that defaults 
are most helpful for those who need the most help.12 
 
largely assumes—as policymakers appear to do—that individual and social welfare are 
in harmony.  
  6 Ian  Ayres,  Menus Matter, 73 U Chi L Rev 3, 4–5 (2006). Ayres has elsewhere rec-
ognized that default rules vary in stickiness. See, for example, Ayres, 121 Yale L J at 
2084–92 (cited in note 4).  
  7  Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Ox-
ymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1159, 1160–61 (2003). 
  8 See Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 10 (cited in note 1). 
  9  See id at 13.  
  10  Id at 8. 
  11  See William E. Nessmith, Stephen P. Utkus, and Jean A. Young, Measuring the 
Effectiveness of Automatic Enrollment, 31 Vanguard Center for Retirement Rsrch *6 
(Dec 2007), online at https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/CRRAUTO.pdf 
?cbdForceDomain=true (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
  12  See, for example, John Beshears, et al, Public Policy and Saving for Retirement: 
The Autosave Features of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, in John J. Siegfried, ed, Bet-
ter Living through Economics 274, 287 (Harvard 2010) (noting “clear and compelling evi-
dence that automatic enrollment was an effective means of increasing savings and im-
proving economic well-being, particularly of minorities and of the poor”); Signe-Mary 
McKernan and Caroline Ratcliffe, Asset Building for Today’s Stability and Tomorrow’s 
Security *4, 7 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 2009), online at http://www.urban.org 
/uploadedpdf/1001374_asset_building.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013) (listing automatic en-
rollment in retirement-savings vehicles as one of the policies that would “help low-
income families the most”). This interpretation may be erroneous, as there are some low-
income employees who participate because of automatic enrollment but for whom partic-
ipation is not optimal. The details of this argument are beyond the scope of this Article.   
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Inspired by this apparently unmitigated success, policy-
makers and regulators have begun to apply policy defaults to 
other situations where they believe that many people are cur-
rently in welfare-decreasing positions and wide majorities would 
benefit from landing in a different position. The goal is to 
achieve the retirement savings plan participation effects of au-
tomatic enrollment.13 In the consumer finance area, legally re-
quired default terms have been put in place for checking account 
overdraft coverage,14 credit card over-the-limit practices,15 and 
some home-mortgage escrows.16 The Affordable Care Act17 uses 
defaults to increase enrollment in health insurance.18 Consumer 
privacy on the internet appears poised to be the next arena.19 
More seems sure to follow, given an executive order issued by 
President Barack Obama requiring all federal agencies to identi-
fy and consider implementing regulatory approaches inspired by 
libertarian paternalism, including “appropriate default rules.”20 
But how broadly applicable are the results obtained from 
the retirement savings automatic enrollment default? Evidence 
from other contexts indicates that policy defaults may not be as 
effective in increasing welfare as many have hoped, in at least 
two respects. First, defaults created by the law are not always 
sticky and can even be slippery. Second, those who opt out are 
not consistently the ones who are better off outside of the default. 
Why are other defaults so much slipperier than automatic 
enrollment? With respect to the defaults examined here, the key 
 
  13  The goal is not merely to inform people about alternatives—a goal which might 
be met through penalty defaults, see note 4, or forcing people to make a choice between 
presented alternatives (called “mandated choice”), see Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 86 
(cited in note 1).  
  14  12 CFR § 205.17 (prohibiting banks from charging overdraft fees unless the ac-
count holder has opted out of the default and into overdraft coverage). 
  15  12 CFR § 226.56(b) (prohibiting credit card issuers from charging over-the-limit 
fees, unless the cardholder has opted out of the default and into over-the-limit coverage). 
  16  12 CFR § 226.35(b)(3) (requiring some home mortgages to be structured so as to 
escrow for taxes and insurance, but permitting affected borrowers to opt out of this re-
quirement after the first year of mortgage payments).  
  17  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act), Pub L No 111-
148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).  
  18  See notes 209–10 and accompanying text.  
  19  See notes 206–09 and accompanying text. 
  20  Executive Order 13563, 3 CFR 215, 215–17 (2011) (ordering all federal agencies 
to consider using a number of nudges, including default rules, when the agencies 
regulate).  
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is whether the interests of the parties are aligned.21 In the re-
tirement-savings context, the employer, pension-plan provider, 
and most employees generally benefit from greater participation 
rates. But policy defaults have also been established as a means 
to protect individuals where firms have interests at odds with 
the default. This matters because, although the popular litera-
ture emphasizes the universality of the mechanisms that make 
defaults sticky, the strength of these mechanisms varies dra-
matically depending on, for example, the process for opting out 
and the framing of the default. When firms have significant con-
trol over the process for opting out or the context in which the 
defaults are presented, firms can undermine the stickiness of 
policy defaults. Further, individuals who generate the most rev-
enue for firms by opting out may be the very people who would 
benefit most from the default position. Thus, firms may design 
the opt-out process and surrounding frame not only to make a 
policy default slippery in general but specifically to encourage 
those who are worse off outside the default to opt out. In these 
situations, policy defaults may give the appearance of helping 
consumers, while doing little more than helping firms defuse po-
litical demands for substantive consumer protection. 
Part I of this Article examines the mechanisms that make 
defaults sticky as well as practices that firms use to ensure that 
those mechanisms are activated when firms set the defaults. 
Part II provides a case study of a new default explicitly modeled 
on the retirement savings participation default—the checking 
account overdraft default. Drawing on data regarding both the 
overdraft default and other defaults, the Article identifies a non-
exhaustive list of boundary conditions for the effective use of pol-
icy defaults: an opposed party, access to the consumer by that 
party, a confusing decision environment, and consumer prefer-
ence uncertainty. 
Part III then explores steps policymakers might take to en-
sure that policy defaults are not undermined at the implementa-
tion stage and finds that a web of surrounding regulation would 
be needed, including not only rules governing the process by 
 
  21  Others have suggested this previously. See, for example, Michael S. Barr, Sen-
dhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed Financial Services Regula-
tion *4 (New America Foundation Oct 2008), online at http://www.newamerica.net/files 
/naf_behavioral_v5.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias 
and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L Rev 608, 610 (1998). I substantiate the claim 
empirically and flesh out boundary conditions on policy defaults here.  
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which people can opt out of the default (“altering rules”),22 but 
also rules controlling the manner in which the default is pre-
sented (“framing rules”).23 The government, however, is not well 
equipped to control the frame in which people perceive defaults. 
Regulators might attempt a sophisticated marketing campaign, 
but firms are more adept at reaching and influencing consum-
ers. Thus, regulation would need to control firm-framing manip-
ulations, a task severely circumscribed by the protections af-
forded commercial speech under the First Amendment. Further, 
the altering rules needed to support policy defaults will often 
have the effect of substantively constraining firm actions and 
consumer choice, a result at odds with the libertarian-
paternalism rationale for using policy defaults in the first place. 
The Article concludes with a broader lesson about nudging: 
where a party with the means to influence consumer choice op-
poses them, government nudges are likely to fail. 
I.  WHAT MAKES DEFAULTS STICKY? 
The intellectual and empirical foundation for the belief in 
the effectiveness of defaults is strong. Research has repeatedly 
confirmed that, by large margins, people stick with whatever de-
fault rule they are handed, more than would choose that posi-
tion were it not the default. A combination of background condi-
tions and stickiness mechanisms is responsible for this effect. 
Background conditions that contribute to the traction of defaults 
are a confusing decision environment and preference uncertain-
ty. The particular mechanisms that give defaults power can be 
divided into three classes: transaction barriers, judgment and 
decision biases, and preference formation.24 “Transaction barri-
ers” are obstacles to choosing options that reflect preferences, 
even when options and preferences are easily understood. 
“Judgment biases” skew perception and appraisal of options. 
“Decision biases” are reactions to uncertainty about options or 
preferences. Defaults can also garner adherents through 
 
  22 See Ayres, 121 Yale L J at 2036 (cited in note 4); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky De-
faults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L Rev 383, 384–85 (2007). 
  23 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Fu-
ture of Marital Names, 74 U Chi L Rev 761, 840 (2007).  
  24  Others have conflated these categories, but the taxonomy here seems useful. The 
implicit-advice mechanism discussed in Part I.D on preference-formation mechanisms, 
for example, is a conscious process, quite unlike judgment and decision biases, which are 
unconscious.  
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“preference formation,” meaning the very process by which 
preferences are formed. In any particular situation, one or more 
of these three classes of mechanisms may make defaults power-
ful for different individuals to varying degrees depending on, for 
example, how clearly the individual understands her options 
and her preferences.25 
A.  Background Conditions: Confusing Decision Environment 
and Preference Uncertainty 
Good decision making requires mapping personal prefer-
ences onto available options. Defaults become more powerful as 
this mapping becomes more difficult, such as when the options 
are numerous,26 have many complex attributes,27 or are difficult 
to distinguish from one another.28 Defaults exert a stronger pull 
over people who only poorly understand their preferences, hold 
those preferences weakly, or cannot perform the tradeoffs neces-
sary when they have competing preferences.29 If people lack in-
formation or background knowledge needed to understand their 
options, defaults are more likely to draw them in.30 When people 
 
  25  See Jeffrey R. Brown, Anne M. Farrell, and Scott J. Weisbenner, The Downside 
of Defaults *27 (NBER Working Paper, Sept 2011), online at http://www.nber.org 
/programs/ag/rrc/NB11-01%20Brown,%20Farrell,%20Weisbenner%20FINAL.pdf (visited 
Sept 11, 2013) (finding significant heterogeneity in the reasons people cited for sticking 
with a retirement-plan default). 
  26  See, for example, William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias 
in Decision Making, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty 7, 8 (1988) (describing a series of decision-
making experiments finding status-quo bias in the face of multiple choices). 
  27  See, for example, Peter Boxall, W.L. (Vic) Adamowicz, and Amanda Moon, Com-
plexity in Choice Experiments: Choice of the Status Quo Alternative and Implications for 
Welfare Measurement, 53 Austl J Ag & Res Econ 503, 513 (2009) (reporting data showing 
that increasing complexity of choice increases the probability that individuals choose the 
status quo).  
  28  See, for example, Ravi Dhar, Consumer Preference for a No-Choice Option, 24 J 
Consumer Rsrch 215, 229 (1997) (reporting studies that show consumers may experience 
an “inability to choose among alternatives that are relatively close in overall 
attractiveness”). 
  29  See, for example, Korobkin, 51 Vand L Rev at 1622–24 (cited in note 3) (present-
ing evidence that when preference uncertainty is removed, defaults lose their power); 
Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference: An Overview, in Sa-
rah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic, eds, The Construction of Preference 1 (Cambridge 2006) 
(observing that judgment and decision biases are strongest when preferences are uncer-
tain); Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty at 8 (cited in note 26) (finding 
subjects more likely to choose to remain with the status quo when their preferences are 
weaker).  
  30  See Brown, Farrell, and Weisbenner, The Downside of Defaults at *33 figure 1 
(cited in note 25) (reporting that 28.4 percent of employees who stuck with a retirement-
plan default stated that one reason they did so was because they lacked information  
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have few decision-making resources available with which to con-
sider their preferences and options, such as when they are under 
high levels of stress or cognitive load, they are more likely to be 
affected by the mechanisms discussed below and therefore more 
likely to stick with a default.31 
A confusing decision environment and preference uncertain-
ty are neither necessary nor sufficient joint conditions for a de-
fault to garner more adherents than it would were it not the de-
fault. For example, someone might clearly understand an organ-
donation default but be conflicted about her own preferences. On 
the one hand, she might feel a social obligation to consent to do-
nating her organs in the event of her death. On the other, she 
might feel distress at the thought of having her body dismem-
bered after her death. In the face of this conflict, she might pro-
crastinate in making a decision, leaving her in the default posi-
tion regardless of whether that default is presumed consent or 
no consent. Another person might have strong privacy prefer-
ences, but if she does not know that her information is being 
shared, she may fail to opt out of an information-sharing de-
fault. Even when people can easily map their preferences to 
their options, they still might stick to a default they would not 
otherwise favor if the transaction costs outweigh the benefits of 
opting out. But both a confusing decision environment and pref-
erence uncertainty make it more likely that the specific mecha-
nisms described below will affect people’s responses when they 
encounter a default. 
B.  Default Mechanisms: Transaction Barriers 
Transaction barriers include opt-out costs, confusing opt-out 
procedures, and invisible opt-out options. These are not what 
nudgers have in mind, given that they advocate policy defaults 
on the basis that they do not impede the freedom to opt out.32 
 
about their options); id at *17 (finding that lack of background knowledge about invest-
ing increases reliance on a retirement-plan default). 
  31  See, for example, Scott Eidelman and Christian S. Crandall, A Psychological Ad-
vantage for the Status Quo, in John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir, eds, 
Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification 85, 99 (Oxford 
2009).  
  32  See Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 6 (cited in note 1) (“A nudge . . . alters peo-
ple’s behavior in a predicable way without forbidding any options or significantly chang-
ing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy 
and cheap to avoid.”).  
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But in practice, transaction barriers are a common impediment 
to opting out of defaults. 
1.  Costs and confusion. 
The first reason a default might be sticky relates to the pro-
cess for opting out, also called the altering rule. Altering rules 
make defaults sticky in two ways: by imposing actual or per-
ceived costs and/or by creating confusion. To the extent that opt-
ing out of a default imposes actual costs that exceed the benefits 
to be gained by switching, accepting the default could be a con-
scious and rational response. Even the smallest transaction cost 
can make a default stick if the individual does not expect any 
benefit. An employee who does not expect to remain with an em-
ployer long enough for her retirement savings to vest will not 
bother to opt out of a noncontribution default.33 But transaction 
costs can also be misperceived, and it is perceptions that matter 
here. For example, a computer novice might assume that down-
loading and installing a new internet browser will be time con-
suming and technically difficult, when in fact the process is 
quick and almost entirely automated. 
The process for opting out can also be confusing, leading 
some people to accidentally and unknowingly stick with de-
faults. A prime example is the process for opting out of online in-
formation-sharing defaults. When a sample of well-educated in-
ternet users with concerns about online privacy were observed 
using various tools for opting out of default internet tracking 
settings, none were able to opt out to the extent that they de-
sired.34 Moreover, most believed that they had opted out when 
they had not. For example, subjects switched the setting for In-
ternet Explorer 9’s “Tracking Protection” add-on from “disabled” 
to “enabled” and assumed that this meant they had opted out of 
being tracked. But the opt-out process actually requires a further 
 
  33  See Brown, Farrell, and Weisbenner, The Downside of Defaults at *20 (cited in 
note 25) (reporting study results showing that 13.4 percent of participants remained in 
the default retirement plan because they did not expect to work at the company for long 
enough to vest in the plan). 
  34  See Pedro G. Leon, et al, Why Johnny Can’t Opt Out: A Usability Evaluation of 
Tools to Limit Online Behavioral Advertising *20 (Carnegie Mellon University CyLab Oct 
31, 2011), online at http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab11017.pdf (vis-
ited Sept 11, 2013).  
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step of creating a personalized “Tracking Protection List” that 
lists the websites to block.35 
2. Invisibility. 
Another transaction barrier relates to the framing of the de-
fault. When the choice to opt out of a default is not made plain, 
people may perceive a default as unchangeable.36 This is likely to 
be the case in unfamiliar task environments. For example, many 
people stick with the default settings on their computer-software 
programs, despite the ability to customize these, in part because 
they do not know that users can change these settings.37 But if 
another party has the means and motive to switch the default, a 
user could accept the new position through inertia.38 A novice 
computer user at home might accept the manufacturer’s set-
tings; a novice user at work might accept different settings se-
lected by her employer. 
C.  Default Mechanisms: Judgment and Decision Biases 
The second class of reasons for defaults’ magnetism, and the 
one most nudgers have in mind given their behavioral economics 
roots, is judgment and decision biases. Foremost, supporters of 
defaults intend to harness the “status quo effect,” an umbrella 
term for the various biases that cause inertia regardless of 
whether this is the best course.39 Each of the following contrib-
utes to the status quo effect.40 Key to each is the frame in which 
the default is perceived, as explained below. 
 
  35  See id at *10 table 1, 30 figure 13 (noting difficulties that a study’s participants 
had using the blocking tool “IE-TPL”). 
  36  See, for example, Brown, Farrell, and Weisbenner, The Downside of Defaults at 
*33 figure 1 (cited in note 25) (reporting that 19 percent of employees who stuck with a 
retirement plan default stated that they did so because they did not know they could opt 
out). 
  37  See Jessamyn C. West, Without a Net: Librarians Bridging the Digital Divide 21 
(Libraries Unlimited 2011). 
  38  See Korobkin, 51 Vand L Rev at 1605–09 (cited in note 3) (noting that, although 
a default rule can be the position favored by inertia, inertia can also favor any position 
an actor finds herself in). 
  39  See Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty at 33–42 (cited in note 
26).  
  40  In addition to the judgment biases listed here, the process of anchoring and ad-
justment can create what has been dubbed the “default pull.” Where choices include a 
range of possible values, this process can lead people to select not the default, but a 
choice closer to the default than they would otherwise choose. See Nikhil Dhingra, et al, 
The Default Pull: An Experimental Demonstration of Subtle Default Effects on Prefer-
ences, 7 Judgment & Dec Making 69, 75 (2012) (reporting evidence that defaults pull  
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1.  Loss aversion and the endowment effect. 
Defaults may be powerful due to biases in weighing the 
costs and benefits of moving away from the default. Loss aver-
sion, meaning weighting losses more heavily than gains as 
against some reference point, can come into play when losses 
and gains are not in a commensurate currency.41 One explana-
tion for this, called “query theory,” is that people generate more 
answers to the first question they ask themselves than the sec-
ond, and they routinely ask themselves about the benefits of the 
reference point before considering an alternative position.42 To 
the extent that the default position is framed as the reference 
point, loss aversion biases the decision in favor of the default. 
One manifestation of loss aversion is the “endowment ef-
fect”—placing a higher value on what one already possesses (or 
perceives oneself as possessing) than on the same thing when 
one does not possess it.43 The endowment effect occurs because 
possession of the good or position becomes the reference point 
against which loss is measured. 44 
 
decision maker choices closer to the default position than these choices would otherwise 
be, even though the decision maker does not choose the default option itself). Because 
the default choices examined in this Article are all binary—one is either in the default 
position or not in the default position—anchoring and adjustment are not relevant here.  
  41  See Nathan Novemsky and Daniel Kahneman, The Boundaries of Loss Aversion, 
42 J Mktg Rsrch 119, 123–24 (2005).  
  42  See, for example, Isaac Dinner, et al, Partitioning Default Effects: Why People 
Choose Not to Choose, 17 J Exp Psych: Applied 332, 333 (2011) (explaining and providing 
evidence for this “Query Theory” for loss aversion); Kirstin C. Appelt, et al, Time to Re-
tire: Why Americans Claim Benefits Early and How to Encourage Delay *39 (unpublished 
conference paper, Exploring New Frontiers in Financial Capacity for Vulnerable Popula-
tions Workshop, UW-Madison Center for Financial Security, June 5–6, 2012), online at 
http://financialcapability.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/eric-johnson.pdf (visited Sept 11, 
2013) (finding that query order strongly encouraged subjects to prefer the first alterna-
tive considered).  
  43  See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J Econ Beh 
& Org 39, 44 (1980) (coining the term “endowment effect” and reporting experimental 
evidence of its existence). The exposure effect has a similar result through a different 
path. When people are exposed to something and are not harmed in the process, they 
prefer it over something to which they have not been exposed. See, for example, Robert 
B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J Personality & Soc Psych Monograph 
Supp 1, 13 (1968). 
  44  See Russell Korobkin, Wrestling with the Endowment Effect, or How to Do Law 
and Economics without the Coase Theorem, in Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman, eds, Ox-
ford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law (Oxford forthcoming).  
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2. Discounting. 
A more significant default effect would be likely where the 
perceived upfront costs of opting out are immediate and certain, 
whereas the perceived benefits are uncertain and/or in the dis-
tant future, due to excessive discounting over time and uncer-
tainty.45 Discounting over time and uncertainty probably plays a 
large role in the magnetism of the still-common default retire-
ment savings contribution rate of zero. Saving for retirement 
means a certain loss of current income. The benefits are in the 
future and, given the unpredictable performance of most retire-
ment investments, often uncertain. Rather than trading the up-
front certain loss for an uncertain future gain, employees stick 
with the default. The same may be true for many health-
protective behaviors—the costs of taking a run in the rain today 
are immediate and certain, whereas the health benefits are un-
certain and in the future, leading people to stay in the proverbi-
al couch-potato default position. 
3. Procrastination. 
Different causal mechanisms may be at play when the deci-
sion is perceived as difficult to make or as involving high stakes. 
Anticipated cognitive or emotional difficulty can lead to procras-
tination in engaging in the research and deliberation people 
would like to apply to the decision, and then a failure to make 
any decision.46 For example, increasing the number of invest-
ment options in a pension plan makes allocating savings among 
the options more cognitively challenging for many employees 
and leads more employees to stick with the default allocation.47 
Even when options are few, when decision makers find tradeoffs 
among choices challenging, they gravitate towards the default 
 
  45  See Yaacov Trope and Nira Liberman, Construal-Level Theory of Psychological 
Distance, 117 Psych Rev 440, 451–53 (2010) (explaining the tendency for people to dis-
count over psychological distance, including over time and over uncertainty). 
  46  See Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q J 
Econ 121, 122 (2001) (explaining why high stakes can lead to procrastination). See also 
Brown, Farrell, and Weisbenner, The Downside of Defaults at *33 figure 1 (cited in note 
25) (reporting that 37.9 percent of employees who stuck with a retirement-plan default 
stated that they did so because they never got around to making a choice). 
  47  See Sheena Sethi-Iyengar, Gur Huberman, and Wei Jiang, How Much Choice Is 
Too Much? Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen 
P. Utkus, eds, Pension Design and Structure: New Lessons from Behavioral Finance 83, 
88–91 (Oxford 2004).  
1168   The University of Chicago Law Review  [80:1155 
    
status quo.48 An example previously discussed is organ donation. 
The conflict some people feel about whether to be an organ donor 
in the event of death may contribute to the magnetism of both 
presumed consent and no-consent organ donation defaults.49 
4. Omission  bias. 
Fear of making the wrong decision can also give defaults 
traction due to omission bias and regret aversion. People are 
more likely to blame themselves and experience regret about a 
poor outcome when they make an active decision to leave a de-
fault (an error of commission) than when the outcome is caused 
by having remained with the default (an error of omission).50 
They stick with the default to avoid potential self-blame, a phe-
nomenon dubbed “omission bias.” For example, some parents 
who know that a failure to vaccinate is riskier than vaccination 
still choose to remain with the default to avoid the smaller risk 
inherent in the action of getting their children vaccinated.51 
Omission bias leads these parents to stick with the inaction de-
fault. They will not take an action (vaccination) that could put 
their children at risk even though their inaction (failure to vac-
cinate) places the children at greater risk. 
D.  Default Mechanisms: Preference Formation 
A third driver of stickiness is the way in which people use 
defaults to form their own preferences. 
1. Implicit  advice. 
People sometimes treat defaults as a form of implicit ad-
vice.52 This is particularly likely when the party that has chosen 
the default is perceived as having the individual’s or society’s 
best interests in mind, such as the government or an employer. 
 
  48  See, for example, Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty at 31–33 
(cited in note 26). 
  49  See Carmen M. Radecki and James Jaccard, Psychological Aspects of Organ Do-
nation: A Critical Review and Synthesis of Individual and Next-of-Kin Donation Deci-
sions, 16 Health Psych 183, 186–87 (1997).  
  50  See Jonathan Baron and Ilana Ritov, Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59 
Org Beh & Hum Dec Processes 475, 478 (1994). 
  51  See David A. Asch, et al, Omission Bias and Pertussis Vaccination, 14 Med Dec 
Making 118, 120–21 (1994).  
  52  See McKenzie, Liersch, and Finkelstein, 17 Psych Sci at 416–17 (cited in note 2) 
(finding that people believe defaults reflect what the person who set the default thinks is 
best for them).  
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For example, some employees interpret an employer’s selection 
of default employee-benefit levels as the employer’s endorse-
ment53 or assessment of what most employees want.54 Along 
these same lines, individuals may perceive the default as repre-
senting the most popular choice (as opposed to the default lead-
ing to the most popular choice) and select it due to faith in the 
wisdom of others or a desire to conform to perceived social 
norms.55 In reality, default settings may have been mandated by 
law, selected by self-interested benefits providers, or set long ago 
based on now-outdated information. But unless people know 
otherwise, they may assume that defaults have been consciously 
and benevolently chosen by someone with more expertise than 
they possess. 
2. Experience. 
Although not what nudging proponents have in mind, when 
preexisting preferences are uncertain, defaults could also be 
powerful in forming preferences through experience.56 If the op-
portunity to opt out of the default is presented after the decision 
maker has spent some time in the default position, not only 
might the transaction costs of change be high—and loss aver-
sion, the endowment effect, and omission bias kick in—but the 
decision maker might have developed a new preference in favor 
of the default.57 That is, the decision maker might try it and like 
it. Yet if a different default had been selected, the decision mak-
er might have been just as likely to form a preference in favor of 
 
  53  See Brown, Farrell, and Weisbenner, The Downside of Defaults at *33 figure 1 
(cited in note 25) (reporting that 20 percent of employees who stuck with their employ-
er’s retirement-plan default stated that one reason they did so was they believed their 
employer had endorsed the default). 
  54 See McKenzie, Liersch, and Finkelstein, 17 Psych Sci at 416–17 (cited in note 2) 
(finding that people believe defaults reflect what the person who set the default believes 
most people want).  
  55  See Thaler and Sunstein, 93 Am Econ Rev at 177 (cited in note 7). Faith in the 
wisdom of others has been dubbed “social proof.” Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: Science 
and Practice 100 (Allyn and Bacon 4th ed 2001). 
  56  Nudge emphasizes that defaults should be set to what a person who had ration-
ally reflected on the choice would select. Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 12 (cited in note 
1). This implies that the default would reflect existing preferences rather than cause 
preferences to change.  
  57  Distinguishing between the influence of judgment biases that affect the evalua-
tion of choices and the preference-forming effects of experience may not be possible, but 
it seems that more than biases cause people to prefer what they know over what they do 
not know.  
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that default.58 The effect is similar to that of a free sample. For 
example, many internet browsers and mobile devices come with 
preinstalled, default bookmarks. Although the bookmarks can 
often be easily removed, firms pay to have them preinstalled. 
These firms know that consumers are more likely to navigate to 
sites that have been bookmarked and that some of these con-
sumers will, through experience, like what they find there.59 
E. Firm-Set  Defaults 
1.  The success of firm-set defaults. 
Firms regularly employ defaults to achieve desired out-
comes. Not all defaults benefit firms directly, and many benefit 
consumers at the same time. Products often are sold with maxi-
mally safe settings as the default, shielding consumers from 
physical injury and manufacturers from injury to reputation and 
product-defect liability.60 But some firm-set defaults provide 
benefits to firms and potential costs to consumers. Autorenewal 
of subscriptions, insurance automatically sold with car rentals, 
default mailing list sign-ups, and prechecked “options” added to 
online purchases are all common examples. As explained by an 
assistant managing editor at The New York Times, the paper 
was able to raise its home-delivery price by 5 percent during the 
recession while retaining 99.99 percent of its subscribers due to 
the default effect of credit card autorenewal payments: “We have 
north of 800,000 subscribers paying north of $700 a year for 
home delivery. . . . I think a lot of it has to do with the fact that 
 
  58  See William G. Gale, et al, Increasing Annuitization in 401(k) Plans with Auto-
matic Trial Income, Retirement Security Project Report No 2008-2 10–11 (Retirement 
Security Project 2008), online at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers 
/2008/06_annuities_gale/06_annuities_gale.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013) (suggesting that 
biases that discourage retirees from annuitizing their savings upon retirement could be 
counteracted by defaulting them into annuitization, with an option to opt out, and ex-
plaining that by trying annuitization for two years, retirees would discover through ex-
perience whether they like it).  
  59  See, for example, Frequently Asked Questions (Opera Software 2013), online at 
http://www.opera.com/company/investors/faq/#faq3 (visited Sept 11, 2013) (explaining 
that one of the ways the Opera browser generates revenue is through fees paid by com-
panies for integrated search and shopping bars). 
  60  See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2, comment a (1998).  
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they’re literally not understanding  what  they’re  paying. . . . 
That’s the beauty of the credit card.”61  
Given the power of defaults to attract business, controlling 
the default can be extremely valuable. When landline telephone 
companies position their optional wire-maintenance plan as a 
service to which consumers must subscribe, 44 percent of con-
sumers do so; when the companies position the service as part of 
the default package from which consumers must unsubscribe, 
over 80 percent of consumers buy it.62 Google spends hundreds of 
millions of dollars to be the default search engine on web brows-
ers, and browser-owning firms pay to have their browser be the 
default preloaded on computers.63 
2.  Tools used by firms to make defaults sticky. 
Firms actively work to increase the power of their defaults 
using each of the three classes of mechanisms described above—
transaction barriers, judgment and decision biases, and prefer-
ence formation. By surrounding their defaults with a web of 
carefully selected altering rules and framing devices, firms aim 
to catch any consumer who might otherwise escape the default. 
Firms ensure that the altering rule—the process for opting 
out of the default—bolsters the default.64 For example, firms 
with automatically renewing subscriptions that consumers can 
sign up for in minutes online may require spending an hour on 
hold with customer service to cancel.65 Firms stymie consumers 
who might attempt to opt out, using fine print or confusing 
 
  61  Jeff Bercovici, NY Times Editor on the ‘Beauty’ of Readers’ Ignorance (Forbes Nov 
10, 2010), online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2010/11/10/ny-times-editor 
-on-the-beauty-of-readers-ignorance (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
  62  See Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Con-
trol of Personal Information, 74 Wash L Rev 1033, 1092 & n 284 (1999) (describing the 
results of a Federal Communications Commission study). 
  63  See Steve Lohr, The Default Choice, So Hard to Resist, NY Times BU5 (Oct 16, 
2011). 
  64  See, for example, Sovern, 74 Wash L Rev at 1085–87 (cited in note 62) (detailing 
ways in which firms use invisibility, costs, and confusion to deter consumers from opting 
out of defaults that allow firms to collect and use personal consumer information). 
  65  See, for example, Kara Rowland, Customers Say XM Didn’t Let Them Go without 
a Fight, Wash Times A1 (June 20, 2007), online at http://www.washingtontimes.com 
/news/2007/jun/20/customers-say-xm-didnt-let-them-go-without-a-fight/?page=all (visited 
Sept 11, 2013) (“It took more than two weeks, five phone calls, numerous e-mails . . . and 
ultimately a formal complaint to our state attorney general to have our subscriptions 
canceled as requested.”).   
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websites as transaction barriers.66 Or they revert consumers to 
the default, requiring consumers to opt out repeatedly.67 
Firms exacerbate judgment and decision biases intentional-
ly through framing devices. They advertise the benefits of the 
default,68 both to directly shape preferences and so that consum-
ers will consider the benefits of the default before considering 
any alternatives, thereby leveraging the query-theory process 
that may drive loss aversion and thus the default. They increase 
the difficulty of decisions to foster procrastination, thereby en-
couraging use of the default. For example, the 50 privacy but-
tons and 170 options Facebook users must wade through in the 
course of rejecting the website’s preset privacy defaults appear 
designed to encourage sticking with the default rather than to 
respond to user demand for all 170 options.69 Firms play on 
omission bias, warning users that if a user takes an affirmative 
action to change the default, the user and not the firm will be 
responsible for the results.70 
 
  66  See, for example, Ben Popken, RyanAir Hides Travel Insurance Opt-Out under 
“Country of Residence” Drop-Down (Consumerist Sept 17, 2010), online at 
http://consumerist.com/2010/09/ryanair-hides-travel-insurance-opt-out-under-country-of 
-residence-drop-down.html (visited Sept 11, 2013) (demonstrating how an airline’s web-
site leads consumers to unwittingly accept the firm’s default travel insurance when they 
buy a plane ticket because the opt-out choice is hidden behind a drop-down menu); Deb-
bie Timmins, How to Turn Off Xbox Live Auto-Renewal Online! (Average Gamer Oct 21, 
2010), online at http://www.theaveragegamer.com/2010/10/21/how-to-turn-off-xbox-live 
-auto-renewal-online (visited Sept 11, 2013) (explaining how Microsoft has hidden the 
link that must be clicked to stop Xbox Live from automatically renewing). 
  67  See, for example, Nick Wingfield, Microsoft Quashed Effort to Boost Online 
Privacy, Wall St J (Aug 1, 2010), online at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052748703467304575383530439838568.html (visited Sept 11, 2013) (de-
scribing how Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 8.0 browser defaults to a setting by which ad-
vertisers can track users’ online browsing, and although users can opt out of the default, 
they must do so every time they start up the software); Ben Popken, Call Every Time to 
Make Sure Extra Payments Go to Paying Down Principal (Consumerist May 3, 2011), 
online at http://consumerist.com/2011/05/03/call-every-time-to-make-sure-extra-payments 
-go-to-paying-down-principal (visited Sept 11, 2013) (reporting one bank that, by default, 
applies any payment on a mortgage beyond the amount due to future interest rather 
than the principal and requires borrowers who want to pay down the principal to call in 
every month to request a change in the way the payment is applied). 
  68  See, for example, IBM Software Subscription and Support ( I B M ) ,  o n l i n e  a t  
http://www-01.ibm.com/software/lotus/passportadvantage/softwaremaintenance.html 
(visited Sept 11, 2013) (describing the benefits of automatically renewing subscription to 
IBM software support, which is the default). 
  69  See Nick Bilton, Price of Facebook Privacy? Start Clicking, NY Times B8 (May 
13, 2010). 
  70  For example, typing “about:config” into the location bar on the Firefox browser 
brings up a dialog box warning users attempting to make changes to the browser’s  
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Firms attempt to shape consumer preferences to favor the 
default. They trumpet the benefits and downplay the costs of the 
default. They explicitly tell consumers that a default is “recom-
mended” or “advised.”71 For example, Facebook dubs its widely 
criticized default privacy settings “recommended.”72 
In affirmatively nurturing the conditions and mechanisms 
that push consumers towards the default, firms implicitly 
acknowledge that defaults, per se, are not necessarily all that 
powerful. It is the combination of a default, opt-out process, and 
framing that is collectively powerful. 
Experimental evidence supports this conclusion. Subjects 
were given a choice marked as the default and a nondefault op-
tion under the following conditions: The process for opting out 
was easy, costless, and obvious, so costs, confusion, and invisibil-
ity were not present. The subjects spent no time in the default 
position prior to a decision, so loss aversion, the endowment ef-
fect, and preference formation through experience could not 
come into play. Discounting did not favor the default over opting 
out. The decision had to be made during the experiment, mean-
ing neither procrastination nor inaction to avoid regret were 
possible. Finally, subjects had no reason to think that the de-
fault might convey advice. Under these conditions, the default 
had little or no effect on subjects’ choices.73 The lesson for policy 
defaults is clear: to draw people to the default, the conditions 
must exist or be created that trigger the mechanisms that make 
defaults sticky. 
 
default settings: “This might void your warranty! . . . You should only continue if you are 
sure of what you are doing.” 
  71  For example, computer software programs often come with “recommended” de-
fault installation settings. See, for example, Wifi Network (2009), online at 
http://support.wmwifirouter.com/documentation/57/Wifi_network (visited Sept 11, 2013) 
(“The default and advised setting for this is 1, and you should not change it unless you 
know what you are doing.”). 
  72  See Dave Taylor, Recommended Facebook Privacy Settings: Everyone? (The Busi-
ness Blog at Intuitive.com June 2, 2010), online at http://www.intuitive.com/blog 
/recommended_facebook_privacy_settings_everyone.html (visited Sept 11, 2013); Kevin 
Bankston, Facebook’s New Privacy Changes: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Deeplinks 
Blog (Electronic Frontier Foundation Dec 9, 2009), online at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/facebooks-new-privacy-changes-good-bad-and-ugly 
(visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  73  See Julie R. Agnew, et al, Who Chooses Annuities? An Experimental Investigation 
of the Role of Gender, Framing and Defaults, 98 Am Econ Rev 418, 421 (2008).  
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II.  WHAT MAKES DEFAULTS SLIPPERY? 
As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion of firm-set de-
faults, the power of a default can be enhanced by manipulating 
the opt-out process and the context surrounding the default to 
increase the likelihood that the mechanisms that make defaults 
sticky will be triggered. However, as shown below, the opt-out 
process and the framing of a default can instead be designed so 
as to decrease a default’s power. When a party opposes a policy 
default imposed by the law, that party can minimize transaction 
barriers so that these will not bolster the default, and can even 
erect transaction barriers that favor opting out. An opposed par-
ty can not only remove the conditions that trigger judgment and 
decision biases that lead consumers to default positions, but can 
even create conditions that trigger these biases to lead consum-
ers to opt out. To further encourage opting out, a party can at-
tempt to directly shape people’s preferences. The law often plac-
es some altering and framing rules in the way of opting out of 
policy defaults. But parties implementing those rules may be 
able to shape the process for opting out and the context in which 
people encounter the default so as to comply with the letter of 
the law while undermining the law’s aim for stickiness. 
A.  Anatomy of a Slippery Default: Checking-Account Overdraft 
1.  The policy default. 
One of the latest attempts by regulators to harness the pow-
er of a default is the case of checking account overdraft coverage 
for automated teller machine (ATM) and nonrecurring debit 
card transactions. An overdraft occurs when an account holder 
unintentionally or intentionally attempts to withdraw more 
from his or her checking account than is available in the account 
and the bank74 covers the withdrawal with its own funds, mean-
ing the account may go to a negative balance. Prior to the impo-
sition of this policy default, the practice of most banks was to al-
low, at the bank’s discretion, all types of transactions (ATM, 
debit, and check transactions, among others) to overdraw an ac-
count, for a fee. Under the new regulation, which came into ef-
fect in 2010,75 banks cannot charge a fee for checking-account 
 
  74  I use the colloquial term “bank” to refer to any financial institution that offers 
checking accounts. 
  75  12 CFR § 205.17(c).   
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overdrafts occasioned by ATM or nonrecurring debit card trans-
actions unless the account holder has opted out of the policy de-
fault and into the bank’s overdraft coverage for these types of 
transactions.76 The policy default does not speak to occasions 
when a check or a scheduled recurring payment overdraws an 
account, and most banks cover these overdrafts for a fee, at the 
bank’s discretion. 
Overdraft coverage is, in effect, a low-risk, high-cost loan. 
Banks face little risk that these loans will not be repaid for two 
reasons. First, banks use their discretion to allow overdrafts on-
ly when the account holder is making regular deposits and in 
fact deny about one-third of transactions that would overdraw a 
customer’s account.77 Second, banks take the next deposit into 
the account to immediately repay the amount overdrawn and 
the fee, without giving account holders an opportunity to divert 
the funds to other purposes.78 
Yet the price charged to consumers for overdraft coverage is 
relatively high in relation to the amount borrowed. Among 
banks studied by the FDIC in 2006, the median negative bal-
ance from a debit transaction on which an overdraft fee was 
charged was about $20,79 and the median fee was $27.80 Larger 
 
  76  12 CFR § 205.17.  
  77  See, for example, Chase Debit Card Coverage *1 (Chase 2011), online at 
https://chaseonline.chase.com/resources/Chase_Opt_In_Branch_Flyer_v6.pdf (visited 
Sept 11, 2013) (“[W]e typically do not pay overdrafts if your account is not in good stand-
ing, or you are not making regular deposits.”); Helpful Tips on Managing Your Account 
(M&T Bank 2013), online at https://www.mtb.com/personal/loanscredit 
/OverdraftProtection/ManageMyAccount/Pages/Managing-Your-Account.aspx (visited 
Sept 11, 2013) (reserving the right to deny transactions that would overdraft an ac-
count);  Frequently Asked Questions (TD Bank 2013), online at 
http://www.tdbank.com/popup/TDAFAQ.html (visited Sept 11, 2013) (“TD Bank FAQ”) 
(same). See also 12 CFR § 205.17(b)(3) Supp I (noting that banks retain discretion to de-
ny transactions that overdraw an account even if the consumer has opted out of the poli-
cy default); Ron Lieber and Andrew Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards Is Painful, but 
Not for Banks, NY Times A20 (Sept 9, 2009). 
  78  See Center for Responsible Lending, Consumer Federation of America, and Na-
tional Consumer Law Center, Comments to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
Docket No CFPB-2012-0007, 77 Fed Reg 12031 (Feb 28, 2012): Impacts of Overdraft Pro-
grams on Consumers *3 (Consumer Federation of America June 29, 2012), online at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Comments.CFPB.Overdraft.CRL.CFA%20.NCLC6.29 
.12.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013) (reporting various bank overdraft practices and listing 
recommendations for improvements). 
  79  See Patricia Cashman, et al, FDIC Study of Bank Overdraft Programs v (FDIC 
Nov 2008), online at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/overdraft/FDIC138_Report 
_Final_v508.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013) (“FDIC Study”) (reporting that the median dollar 
amount of debit-overdraft transactions was $20 and that these were the most frequent 
transactions).  
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institutions charged more,81 leading to the “$35 cup of coffee” 
familiar in media reports about overdraft.82 Because each trans-
action that overdraws an account may trigger a fee, an account 
holder who buys a cup of coffee at one store, groceries at anoth-
er, hardware from a third, and so on can incur multiple fees in a 
single day, potentially accruing into the hundreds of dollars.83 
For those who do not repay their overdrafts and associated fees, 
the ultimate price is loss of checking-account privileges; an un-
paid overdraft is the most common reason for an involuntarily 
closed account, and other institutions normally will not open a 
new account for someone with a history of an involuntarily 
closed account.84 
The price of overdraft coverage is also relatively high as 
compared to other forms of short-term credit. A common fee 
structure is to require overdrawn account holders to bring their 
account balance back to zero within a week or face a “sustained” 
overdraft fee.85 A $27 fee on what is in effect a loan of $20 for 
seven days translates to an annual percentage rate (APR) of 
over 7,000 percent.86 In contrast, the average APR on a credit 
card for a cash advance about this time period was under 30 
 
  80  See id at 15. 
  81 See  id. 
  82  See, for example, Editorial, That $35 Cup of Coffee, NY Times A22 (Nov 14, 
2009). 
  83  See Lieber and Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards, NY Times at A1 (cited in 
note 77) (telling the story of a consumer who had deposited a check that had not yet 
cleared and then bought a cup of coffee, a few screws, a movie ticket, and other items, 
and ended up with $238 in overdraft fees that day); Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed Reg 59033, 59038 (2009) (final rule; 
official staff commentary) (noting that account holders can incur hundreds of dollars of 
fees in one day). 
  84  See Dennis Campbell, F. Asís Martínez-Jerez, and Peter Tufano, Bouncing Out of 
the Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures, 36 J 
Bank & Fin 1224, 1224 (2012). In addition, over 8 percent of consumers who have volun-
tarily closed their bank accounts explain that they have chosen to be unbanked so as to 
avoid overdraft and bounced-check fees. Michael Bachman, et al, FDIC National Survey 
of Unbanked and Underbanked Households *26 figure 4.13 (FDIC Dec 2009), online at 
http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2009/full_report.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  85  The number of days the overdraft can remain outstanding before a “sustained 
overdraft fee” kicks in varies from three to ten days. See Chris Friedrich, The High Cost 
of Opting In to Overdraft Fees (CreditCards.com Sept 13, 2010), online at 
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/overdraft-fees-opt-in-credit-card-act-1282.php 
(visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  86  The APR can be calculated by multiplying the amount of the fee by the propor-
tion of one year for which the sum is borrowed, divided by the sum borrowed, multiplied 
by 100. Here, the calculation would be $27 × (365/7)/$20 × 100 = 7,039%.  
2013]  When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults 1177 
 
percent.87 Further, many banks offer less expensive ways to pay 
for transactions that would otherwise overdraw an account: 
opening an “overdraft line of credit” or linking a checking ac-
count to a savings or credit card account. In 2006, the typical 
charge for the former was 18 percent APR and for the latter was 
a $5 flat funds-transfer fee (plus, if applicable, any fees charged 
by the card issuer).88 
Why are banks able to charge high fees for overdraft cover-
age? Internal bank documents explain that those who incur 
overdraft fees do not expect to overdraw their accounts, and 
therefore neither arrange for lower-cost ways to cover transac-
tions that will overdraw their accounts nor shop for checking ac-
counts with the lowest overdraft fees.89 Banks therefore have no 
competitive incentive to reduce overdraft fees to cost. 
Consequently, overdraft coverage is quite lucrative for 
banks. In 2009, US consumers spent an estimated $20 billion on 
overdraft fees occasioned by ATM or debit transactions.90 Among 
banks studied by the FDIC in 2006, overall overdraft fees 
amounted to about 75 percent of bank deposit account service 
charges revenue and 25 percent of total bank noninterest in-
come.91 As the banking industry has frankly explained, these 
fees exceed the cost of providing overdraft coverage and instead 
subsidize much of the cost of “free” checking accounts.92 
 
  87  See Government Accountability Office, Credit Cards: Credit Cards—Increased 
Complexity in Rates and Fees Heightens Need for More Effective Disclosures to Consum-
ers, GAO-6-929, 18 (Sept 2006), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf (vis-
ited Sept 11, 2013) (finding, among the most popular cards from major issuers in 2005, 
cash advance APRs were “around 20 percent on average”). 
  88  Cashman, et al, FDIC Study at iii (cited in note 79). 
  89  See Mark Armstrong and John Vickers, Consumer Protection and Contingent 
Charges, 50 J Econ Lit 477, 480 & n 13 (2012), citing Office of Fair Trading, Personal 
Current Accounts in the UK: An OFT Market Study *4 (UK Office of Fair Trading July 
2008), online at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/financial_products/OFT1005.pdf 
(visited Sept 11, 2013).  
  90  See Andrew Martin and Ron Lieber, Overdraft Open Season, NY Times B1 (Feb 
23, 2010) (reporting that industry consultant Michael Moebs estimated that $20 billion 
in bank revenue from ATM and nonrecurring debit transaction overdrafts occurred in 
2009).  
  91  Cashman, et al, FDIC Study at 56 (cited in note 79) (reporting a 2006 study’s 
findings that overdraft charges accounted for 74.4 percent of total service charges on de-
posit accounts and 24.8 percent of the total noninterest income earned in sample banks). 
See also id at 62 (reporting a low level of checking-account charge offs, meaning that the 
vast majority of overdrafts and associated fees are repaid by account holders). 
  92  See 74 Fed Reg at 59039 (noting that the banking industry, in opposing the 
overdraft policy default, argued that, because overdraft fees subsidize checking-account 
maintenance costs, any loss of overdraft revenue would harm consumers who currently 
enjoy checking-account services without paying for them).   
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Although overdraft fees subsidize all checking accounts, 
they are incurred by a small subset of consumers. In 2006, at 
banks studied by the FDIC, an estimated 75 percent of account 
holders never overdrew their accounts, 12 percent overdrew 
their accounts only infrequently, and the 14 percent of bank cus-
tomers who overdrew their accounts five or more times per year 
incurred over 90 percent of all overdraft fees.93 This last group 
was disproportionately minority and low income.94 In 2009, one 
widely cited industry consultant estimated that 90 percent of 
overdraft fees were paid by the poorest 10 percent of checking-
account holders.95 Because these fees effectively subsidize all 
checking accounts, the effect is that the poorest account holders 
pay the costs of all accounts. 
In issuing the 2010 overdraft rules, banking authorities cit-
ed a number of motivations for using this new policy default, in-
cluding: 
  a desire to prevent consumers who frequently over-
draw their accounts from “entering into a harmful cy-
cle of repeated overdrafts”;96 
  concern for the costliness of overdraft coverage, partic-
ularly in relation to the amount borrowed;97 
  consumers’ stated preference to have ATM and debit-
card overdrafts declined rather than incurring a fee;98 
and 
  behavioral research suggesting that consumers are 
likely to overoptimistically assume they will not over-
draw their accounts.99 
 
  93  Cashman, et al, FDIC Study at iv (cited in note 79).  
  94  See Leslie Parrish and Josh Frank, An Analysis of Bank Overdraft Fees: Pricing, 
Market Structure and Regulation, 45 J Econ Issues 353, 357 (2011) (referencing findings 
that low-income and minority consumers are more likely than the general population to 
have overdrawn their checking accounts); Cashman, et al, FDIC Study at v (cited in note 
79) (finding that those who live in low-income zip codes are more likely than others to 
pay overdraft fees); Protecting Consumers from Abusive Overdraft Fees: The Fairness and 
Accountability in Receiving Overdraft Coverage Act, Hearing on S 1799 before the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong, 1st Sess 33, 35–36 (2009) 
(statement of Jean Ann Fox, Director of Financial Services, Consumer Federation of 
America).  
  95 Editorial,  Debit Card Trap, NY Times A26 (Aug 20, 2009) (citing Moebs Ser-
vices). 
  96  74 Fed Reg at 59038. 
  97  74 Fed Reg at 59038. 
  98  74 Fed Reg at 59039. 
  99  74 Fed Reg at 59044.  
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Regulators decided to address these concerns using a default 
based explicitly on research showing that most people stick with 
the default. Regulators noted that “studies have suggested[  ] 
[that] consumers are likely to adhere to the established default 
rule, that is, the outcome that would apply if the consumer takes 
no action” and cited studies of the effectiveness of automatic en-
rollment in increasing participation in retirement savings 
plans.100 
Thus, regulators made clear that their goal in promulgating 
the policy default was not merely to force banks to reveal the ex-
istence of overdraft coverage, but to move consumers who would 
otherwise overdraw their accounts into the default position so as 
to decrease the incidence of overdraft fees, particularly among 
those consumers who were otherwise likely to overdraw repeat-
edly.101 On the other hand, regulators also concluded that a 
small group of consumers might benefit from the “occasional” 
use of ATM or nonrecurring debit overdraft coverage if they 
would otherwise “be precluded from completing important 
transactions” because they lack sufficient funds in their ac-
counts and lack another means of payment.102 These situations 
are likely to be rare. Transaction records show that on the day 
they overdraw, most people have a cheaper source of funds 
available to them in the form of available credit on a credit card 
or cash in another checking or savings account.103 Other con-
sumers might find deferring or forgoing the purchase to be less 
costly than making the purchase and incurring overdraft fees. 
The new rules require banks to place account holders by de-
fault into a fee structure that does not charge for overdrafts oc-
casioned by ATM or nonrecurring debit card transactions.104 As a 
result, banks no longer permit ATM and nonrecurring debit 
transactions to overdraw an account unless the account holder 
has opted out of the default. Banks can continue their practice, 
at their discretion and without first obtaining consumer consent, 
of covering overdrafts occasioned by checks and recurring 
 
  100  74 Fed Reg at 59038 & n 25. 
  101  In other words, this was not to be merely an information-forcing penalty default, 
but a sticky policy default. For a discussion of the distinction between penalty defaults 
and policy defaults, see note 4. 
  102  74 Fed Reg at 59039. 
  103 See Victor Stango and Jonathan Zinman, What Do Consumers Really Pay on 
Their Checking and Credit Card Accounts? Explicit, Implicit, and Avoidable Costs, 99 
Am Econ Rev Papers & Proc 424, 424–25 (2009).  
  104  12 CFR § 205.17(b); 12 CFR § 205.17(b)(1)–(2) Supp I.  
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payments and charging a fee.105 The Federal Reserve Board 
explained the regulations’ different treatment of different types 
of transactions as follows: Checks and scheduled recurring pay-
ments are not included in the mandated default because con-
sumers expressed a preference for these to be covered, given 
that these transactions tend to be for necessities such as rent 
and mortgage payments, and given that when these are not paid 
a merchant will usually charge the consumer a fee. In contrast, 
consumers expressed a preference for having ATM and nonre-
curring debit transactions declined, given that these tend to be 
discretionary transactions, and given that when these are de-
clined consumers are not charged a fee.106 
2.  The law governing opting out. 
Banks find overdraft coverage lucrative and would prefer 
consumers be in a position to incur overdraft fees. In designing 
the new overdraft rule, regulators were mindful of the potential 
for bank “circumvention or evasion” of the default.107 The regula-
tion consists of both a policy default and a surrounding web of 
altering and framing rules intended to make the default sticky. 
The altering rules supporting the new default consist of two 
parts. First, to opt out a consumer must take an “affirmative” 
action,108 such as speaking to a bank representative in person or 
by phone, clicking a box on an online banking form, or sending 
the bank a written request.109 The idea is to prevent banks from 
placing language opting out of the default in routinely unread 
account disclosures that would lead consumers to passively opt 
out of the policy default. Affirmative assent to overdraft cover-
age for ATM and nonrecurring debit transactions must be given 
once, not for each individual transaction. Second, banks must 
provide the same account terms, conditions, and features to ac-
count holders who stick with the default as they provide to ac-
count holders who opt out.110 For example, banks cannot condi-
tion overdraft coverage for checks and recurring payments on 
 
  105  12 CFR § 205.17(b)(2) Supp I.  
  106  74 Fed Reg at 59040–41.  
  107  74 Fed Reg at 59044.  
  108  12 CFR § 205.17(b)(iii). 
  109  12 CFR § 205.17(b)(4)(i)–(iv) Supp I.  
  110  12 CFR § 205.17(b)(3).  
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opting out of the ATM and nonrecurring debit transaction 
default.111 
The new overdraft rule is also complemented by regulations 
that attempt to frame the context in which the choice to opt out 
is presented to consumers. Before consumers can opt out, banks 
must provide them with a notice that briefly describes the 
bank’s overdraft-coverage program for ATM and nonrecurring 
debit transactions; the fees imposed for an ATM or nonrecurring 
debit transaction that overdraws an account; directions for how 
to consent to overdraft coverage on ATM and nonrecurring debit 
transactions; and the existence of any alternative plan the bank 
offers to cover overdrafts, such as a linked savings account or 
credit card account or line of credit.112 At its option, the bank 
may also include information about its overdraft practices for 
checks and recurring payments and the right of the consumer to 
revoke consent to overdraft coverage for ATM and nonrecurring 
debit transactions.113 To prevent this notice from being buried 
among the fine print, potentially leading consumers to opt out of 
the default unintentionally in the course of signing account-
opening documents, nothing other than the above may be con-
tained in the legally mandated notice.114 However, banks are free 
to provide other information about their overdraft practices and 
programs in documents that are separate from this notice.115 As 
an additional safeguard to prevent consumers from unintention-
ally opting out, banks must provide those who opt out with a 
confirmation stating that they can opt back into the default.116 
3.  The limited effects of the policy default. 
In the abstract, the background conditions under which con-
sumers encounter the overdraft-coverage decision make it seem 
an apt situation for using a policy default to increase the num-
ber of people in the default position. Many people are likely to 
find mapping their preferences to their overdraft choices chal-
lenging, given that it presents a confusing decision environment 
in which consumers may be uncertain about their preferences. 
 
  111  12 CFR § 205.17(b)(2). 
  112  12 CFR § 205.17(d)(1)–(5). 
  113  12 CFR § 205.17(d)(6). 
  114  12 CFR § 205.17(d) (stating that the required notice “may not contain any infor-
mation not specified in or otherwise permitted” by the rule).  
  115  74 Fed Reg at 59047 n 39. 
  116  12 CFR § 205.17(b)(1)(iv).  
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Overdraft options, the fee structures for each of them, the 
nomenclature used, and the policy default itself are all confus-
ing. Many banks offer at least four overdraft-treatment possibil-
ities: the default overdraft practices that come with checking ac-
counts, overdraft practices that occur if the consumer opts out of 
the default, overdraft lines of credit, and links from a checking 
account to a savings account or credit card to cover overdrafts.117 
Each comes with its own formula for assessing fees, and the 
fees, formulae, and terminology for each differ at different banks 
and change over time.118 The nomenclature is also confusing. 
“Standard overdraft practices” is the term used in the Federal 
Reserve Board’s model consent form to describe both what hap-
pens when the account holder sticks with the default (at most 
banks this means coverage for checks and scheduled recurring 
payments but not ATM or nonrecurring debit transactions) and 
the fees charged for overdrawing, including by ATM or nonre-
curring debit transaction.119 Banks call all of these products a 
variety of different names. For example, “Courtesy Pay,”120 
“Account Protector,”121 “Bounce Protection,”122 “Debit Card 
 
  117 Some banks offer even more permutations. See, for example, Bob Sullivan, 
Banks’ Hard Sell: Opt In for More Overdraft Fees, The Red Tape Chronicles (NBC News 
July 30, 2010), online at http://redtape.nbcnews.com/_news/2010/07/30/6345569-banks 
-hard-sell-opt-in-for-more-overdraft-fees?lite (visited Sept 11, 2013) (describing an over-
draft program where the consumer pays $4.99 per month in exchange for the ability to 
overdraw the account by up to $30 without incurring an additional fee). 
  118 For example, some banks charge a flat fee per overdraft, others charge tiered 
fees depending on the number of overdrafts, some charge a fee for each day the account 
remains overdrawn or after some specified period has passed and the account has not 
been brought current, others do not charge for small overdrafts, and so forth. See, for 
example, 74 Fed Reg at 59033 (discussing fee structures); Cashman, et al, FDIC Study at 
13–19 (cited in note 79). Banks use a great variety of different names for these fees. See 
Susan K. Weinstock, et al, Still Risky: An Update on the Safety and Transparency of 
Checking Accounts *10 (The PEW Charitable Trusts June 2012), online at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Safe_Checking_in_the 
_Electronic_Age/Pew_Safe_Checking_Still_Risky.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  119 See Model Consent Form for Overdraft Services, 12 CFR § 205, Appendix A-9. 
Using “standard overdraft practices” to refer to the fees charged for overdrafts incurred 
on ATM or nonrecurring debit transactions could lead some consumers to erroneously 
believe that the default practice is to allow these overdrafts and fees. See Weinstock, et 
al, Still Risky at *18 (cited in note 118) (explaining that the terminology banks use to 
describe their overdraft plans can result in consumer confusion). 
  120  With Courtesy Pay, SMCU Has You Covered (San Mateo Credit Union 2013), 
online at http://www.smcu.org/accounts/courtesy.php (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  121  Standard Overdraft Services: Are You In? (Sovereign Bank 2011), online at 
http://www.sovereignbank.com/personal/promotions/sovereign-account-protector.asp (vis-
ited Sept 11, 2013). 
  122  Bounce Protection (Central National Bank 2013), online at 
https://www.centralnational.com/personal/bounceprotection.asp (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
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Advance,”123 and “Overdraft Privilege”124 are each used by dif-
ferent banks to refer to overdraft coverage on ATM and nonre-
curring debit transactions. Even the default is not intuitive, 
treating ATM and nonrecurring debit transactions differently 
than checks and scheduled-recurring payments. The opacity of 
overdraft options presents the potential for a policy default to be 
very effective. 
Overdraft also might be an area where consumer prefer-
ences are weak or conflicted. On the one hand, consumers do 
generally state a preference for the policy default.125 Overdraft-
ers themselves say that they dislike the opt-out position, even 
when they have opted out of the default: Over 75 percent of peo-
ple who in 2012 reported overdrawing their account in the prior 
year stated that they would prefer to have nonrecurring debit 
transactions declined rather than incur a $35 overdraft fee.126 
Over 60 percent of overdrafters said that overdraft coverage 
hurts people more than it helps them.127 On the other hand, most 
consumers—even frequent overdrafters—do not believe they will 
overdraw their accounts, except perhaps in the rarest of emer-
gencies. As regulators noted in promulgating the overdraft de-
fault, consumers are likely to assume overoptimistically they 
will not overdraw.128 Ninety percent of consumers polled in 2012 
who had incurred an overdraft fee in the prior year stated that 
they overdrew their account by mistake and were surprised by 
the fee when they became aware of it.129 Given that they do not 
expect to overdraw, many consumers might feel that any deci-
sion about the default is inconsequential and therefore hold 
their preferences about overdraft coverage only weakly. Other 
 
  123  TD Debit Card Advance (TD Bank 2013), online at http://www.tdbank.com 
/tdadvance (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  124  Overdraft Privilege (First National Bank 2008), online at 
http://www.myfnbbank.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=112&Itemid
=124 (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  125 See notes 105–06 and accompanying text (citing the Federal Reserve Board’s 
finding that consumers preferred to have ATM and nonrecurring debit transactions de-
clined rather than incurring a fee).  
  126 The PEW Center on the States, Overdraft America: Confusion and Concerns 
about Bank Practices *5, 9 n 6 (May 2012), online at http://www.pewhealth.org/uploadedFiles 
/PHG/Content_Level_Pages/Issue_Briefs/SC-IB-Overdraft%20America.pdf (visited Sept 
11, 2013). Even among very frequent overdrafters (those who overdrew more than ten 
times in the prior year), over half stated a preference that their nonrecurring transac-
tions be declined. Id.  
  127  Id at *3.  
  128  74 Fed Reg at 59044. 
  129  The PEW Center on the States, Overdraft America at *4 (cited in note 126).  
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consumers, particularly low-income consumers who fear running 
out of cash, might want overdraft coverage for emergencies, but 
not for ordinary purchases, such that they are conflicted about 
their preferences. In theory, these uncertain preferences should 
tend to make the policy default sticky. 
The reality, however, has turned out differently. Although 
sources report wildly divergent data, the following picture has 
emerged: Not all banks energetically pursued overdraft revenue 
after the change in the law, but those that did have managed to 
achieve high opt-out rates, particularly among consumers with a 
history of frequent overdrafts and new account holders. By No-
vember of 2010, only a few months after the policy default came 
into effect, one large bank stated that for existing account hold-
ers who previously had overdrawn ten or more times per year, 
four to nine times per year, and fewer than four times per year, 
the proportions who had opted out of the default were 53 per-
cent, 41 percent, and 21 percent, respectively.130 A Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau (CFPB) study of a small set of large 
banks suggests somewhat lower numbers for these banks as of 
the end of 2010: 45 percent of heavy overdraft users (over 10 
overdrafts in the first half of 2010) and 35 percent of moderate 
users (4 to 10 overdrafts in the first half of 2010) had opted 
out.131 But for the banks with the highest numbers of opt-outs, 
the CFPB found even higher opt-out rates for heavy overdraft 
users—66 percent by the end of 2010.132 The CFPB’s large-bank 
data set showed 15 percent of all accounts had opted out by the 
end of 2010, but by 2012, some of the large banks the CFPB ex-
amined were achieving opt-out rates of over 50 percent for all 
new accounts.133 Community banks appear to have pushed over-
draft harder; they report opt-out rates of 60 percent across all 
accounts for those banks that offer overdraft coverage.134  
Further, the regressive impact of overdraft fees has likely 
been exacerbated by the new law. Recall that prior to the policy 
default, frequent overdrafters accounted for over 90 percent of 
 
  130 See David Benoit, Customers Opt In for Overdraft Protection, Wall St J C1 (Nov 
26, 2010).  
  131 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Study of Overdraft Programs: A 
White Paper of Initial Data Findings 31 figure 5 (June 2013), online at http://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf (visited Sept 11, 
2013). 
  132  Id at 33 figure 7. 
  133  Id at 32. 
  134  Id at 29.  
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all overdraft fees.135 Since the policy default was imposed, fees 
per overdraft have risen higher; as noted above, the average fee 
before the new rule was $27, but in 2011, industry sources re-
ported that the average fee was between $30 and $35.136 Total 
bank revenue from overdraft fees remains high; one source es-
timates that it decreased less than 15 percent after the policy 
default went into effect.137 Because frequent overdrafters are 
more likely to opt out, it appears that these fees are now even 
more disproportionately borne by this group. 
Thus, the primary goals of the policy default—to move con-
sumers who would otherwise overdraw their accounts into the 
default position so as to decrease the incidence of overdraft fees, 
particularly among those consumers who were otherwise likely 
to overdraw repeatedly—do not appear to have been met, cer-
tainly not on the scale achieved by the retirement savings auto-
matic enrollment default. Given that the default was developed 
particularly to help prior frequent overdrafters avoid overdraft 
fees, it appears to have dramatically failed to achieve this aim. 
4.  Tools used by banks to make the policy default slippery. 
Why is the policy default not stickier, even in the face of al-
tering and framing rules designed to bolster its power and back-
ground conditions that in theory seem ideal? If the mechanisms 
that can make defaults sticky were in fact being triggered now 
that the default rule has changed, then we might conclude that, 
contrary to their survey responses, consumers not only prefer 
overdraft coverage, but prefer it strongly enough to overcome the 
erstwhile stickiness of the default. This would mean that regula-
tors erred in their judgment when they put the policy default in 
place. However, evidence on the ground demonstrates that 
banks, acting largely within the letter of the law, are able to 
neutralize the mechanisms that lead to stickiness or even redirect 
those mechanisms to favor opting out. Although the law places 
 
  135  See note 93. 
  136 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Press Release, CFPB Launches In-
quiry into Overdraft Practices (Feb 22, 2012), online at http://www.consumerfinance.gov 
/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-inquiry-into-overdraft 
-practices (visited Sept 11, 2013). See also note 80 and accompanying text. 
  137 See Moebs Services, Overdraft Fee Revenue in the US Falls to $31.6 Billion in 
2011 (Business Wire Mar 15, 2012), online at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home 
/20120315006272/en/Overdraft-Fee-Revenue-U.S.-Falls-31.6-Billion (visited Sept 11, 
2013). Note that this figure reflects all overdraft fees, including those incurred on ATM, 
debit, check, or electronic transactions.  
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some restrictions on the way the default is framed, banks use 
their substantial discretion to shape the way consumers perceive 
it. Moreover, due to the greater potential profits to be realized 
when frequent overdrafters opt out, banks concentrate their ef-
forts on these consumers.138 
a) Eliminating and inverting transaction barriers.   
i) Removing the cost of opting out.  Although the transaction 
costs of opting out can give defaults traction, that is not the case 
with the overdraft default. Why not? One reason is that banks 
are able to minimize these costs and, in some cases, to eliminate 
the difference between the cost of opting out and the cost of 
sticking with the default. 
For existing account holders, banks make opting out as cost-
less as possible. They provide preaddressed stamped cards on 
which consumers need merely check a box before dropping the 
card in the mail. They permit consumers to consent by pushing a 
button on an ATM.139 To relieve consumers of even these bur-
dens, banks engage in one-on-one marketing. They station bank 
employees at ATMs to approach consumers and pitch them on 
the benefits of opting out.140 For consumers with a history of fre-
quent overdrafts, banks call them at home or approach them 
when they enter a branch to engage in other transactions.141 
For new customers and for account holders using online 
banking, transaction costs do not fortify the default because 
these costs are the same whether the consumer sticks with the 
default or opts out. Banks structure account-opening forms such 
 
  138 See, for example, Sullivan, Banks’ Hard Sell (cited in note 117) (quoting a staff 
attorney at Consumers Union as saying that banks are targeting account holders who 
have a chronically low balance); Martin and Lieber, Overdraft Open Season, NY Times at 
B1 (cited in note 90) (reporting that consultants were advising banks to “focus their pitch 
on the minority of customers who are responsible for the vast majority of overdraft fees”). 
  139 See Laura Northrup, Opt In to Overdraft Protection Right at the ATM (Consum-
erist July 29, 2011), online at http://consumerist.com/2011/07/29/opt-in-to-overdraft-
protection-right-at-the-atm (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  140 See Laura Northrup, Chase Now Has Human ATM Greeter Who Helpfully Sells 
Overdraft Protection (Consumerist July 14, 2010), online at http://consumerist.com/2010 
/07/14/chase-installs-atm-greeter-who-sells-debit-card-overdraft-protection (visited Sept 
11, 2013) (relaying a bank customer’s experience of being confronted by a bank employee 
when withdrawing money from an ATM). 
  141 See Karen Weise, Reforms Fail to Halt Bank Revenue on Debit-Card Overdraft 
Fees (Bloomberg Oct 20, 2011), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-20 
/reforms-fail-to-halt-bank-revenue-on-debit-card-overdaft-fees.html (visited Sept 11, 
2013); Ben Popken, Chase Just Goes Ahead and Adds Overdraft Protection to Your Ac-
count (Consumerist Sept 16, 2010), online at http://consumerist.com/2010/09/16/chase-
just-goes-ahead-and-adds-overdraft-protection-to-your-account (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
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that consumers must check precisely the same number of boxes 
regardless of whether they check the box for sticking with the 
default or check the box for opting out. Regulators explicitly 
permit banks to do this,142 allowing banks to set up a “mandated 
choice” scenario143 rather than one in which the legal default is 
accepted through inaction. This may explain why a greater pro-
portion of new customers appear to have opted out of the default 
than existing account holders.144 Banks are able to force some ex-
isting account holders into a similar mandated-choice situation. 
Banks equalize the small cost of opting out to the same small 
cost consumers must pay to stick with the default by preventing 
use of online banking until the account holder clears a screen 
that requires clicking a button accepting or a button rejecting 
the default.145 
ii) Making the default position costly.  A second reason that 
costs do not fortify the overdraft policy default is that, despite 
the altering rule requiring banks to give consumers the same ac-
count terms regardless of opt-out status, banks are able to im-
pose costs on those who stick with the default and play on com-
mon misperceptions that a failure to opt out will be costly. 
When the policy default went into effect, banks bombarded 
existing account holders with marketing in the postal mail, in 
email, online, and on ATM screens, attempting to convince them 
to opt out.146 As noted, banks went further for frequent users of 
overdraft coverage, contacting them by telephone or when they 
came into branch offices. Declining each offer, even checking a 
box on an online form stating that the account holder did not 
 
  142  See 12 CFR § 205.17(b)(5) Supp I (“A financial institution may require a consum-
er, as a necessary step to opening an account, to choose whether or not to opt into the 
payment of ATM or one-time debit card transactions pursuant to the institution’s over-
draft service.”). 
  143  See note 13.  
  144 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Study of Overdraft Programs: A 
White Paper of Initial Data Findings at 31–32 (cited in note 131). 
  145 See Ben Popken, Banks Luring You into Signing Back Up for High Overdraft 
Fees (Consumerist June 18, 2010), online at http://consumerist.com/2010/06/18/banks-
trying-to-get-you-to-sign-up-for-high-overdraft-fees (visited Sept 11, 2013); Phil Villar-
real, When It Comes to Overdraft Opt-In, Chase Won’t Take No for an Answer (Consum-
erist Aug 6, 2010), online at http://consumerist.com/2010/08/06/when-it-comes-to-
overdraft-opt-in-chase-wont-take-no-for-an-answer (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
  146 See, for example, Sullivan, Banks’ Hard Sell (cited in note 117) (describing ad-
vertising materials and scare tactics banks used to get customers to opt out); Popken, 
Banks Luring You (cited in note 145); Martin and Lieber, Overdraft Open Season, NY 
Times at B1 (cited in note 90).  
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want to opt out, would not stop the barrage.147 Consumers quick-
ly realized that there is an immediate intangible benefit to opt-
ing out—the marketing will stop. The calls and emails will 
cease, the tellers will stop asking, and those who bank online 
will be able to navigate directly to their personal account with-
out clicking through a computer screen asking whether they 
would like to opt out first. One survey found that almost half of 
respondents who reported that they had opted out of the default 
did so at least in part to stop receiving overdraft marketing.148 
Banks also flat out violate the prohibition on different ac-
count terms by offering a day of “float” to consumers who opt out 
of the policy default as well as an exemption from the usual re-
quirement that a deposit must clear before it is available. Be-
cause check deposits can take up to eleven days to clear,149 this 
can be a substantial benefit. One bank’s marketing flyer offers: 
Debit Card Overdraft Coverage on your personal account 
may allow your ATM and everyday debit card transactions 
to be approved before a deposit is available in your ac-
count. . . . [U]se your ATM and debit card and have until the 
end of the same business day to make a deposit or transfer 
money to cover your ATM and everyday debit card purchas-
es.150 
The flyer states that this perk does not apply to those who do 
not opt out of the default; these consumers are advised that they 
“may need to make deposits well in advance to ensure [their] 
ATM and everyday debit card purchases are approved.”151 
Further, although the law does not allow banks to offer 
worse terms to those who stick with the default, banks can 
play on the illusion that a failure to opt out will be costly. Two 
 
  147 See Villarreal, When It Comes to Overdraft Opt-In, Chase Won’t Take No for an 
Answer (cited in note 145). 
  148 Center for Responsible Lending, Banks Collect Overdraft Opt-Ins through Mis-
leading Marketing *3–4 (Apr 2011), online at http://www.responsiblelending.org 
/overdraft-loans/policy-legislation/regulators/CRL-OD-Survey-Brief-final-2-4-25-11.pdf 
(visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  149 Government  Accountability  Office,  Bank Fees: Federal Banking Regulators Could 
Better Ensure That Consumers Have Required Disclosure Documents prior to Opening 
Checking or Savings Accounts *21 (Jan 2008), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items 
/d08281.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  150  Stay Protected with SharePlus ATM and Debit Card Overdraft Coverage at *1 
(SharePlus Federal Bank), online at https://secureforms.c3vault1.com/forms/shareplus 
/pdf/opt-in-details.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  151  Id. See also Chase Debit at *1 (cited in note 77) (explaining the same day of float 
perk for consumers who opt out); TD Bank FAQ (cited in note 77) (same).  
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misperceptions are common. First, consumers believe that opt-
ing out of the default is necessary to avoid bounced checks, even 
though checks and recurring payments are not affected by the 
policy default. In one survey, nearly two-thirds of respondents 
who reported that they had opted out of the default stated that 
one reason they did so was to avoid bouncing paper checks.152 
Second, many people believe that opting out is necessary to 
avoid incurring a fee when a nonrecurring debit card transaction 
is denied for insufficient funds, even though no such fee exists. 
Sixty percent of consumers who reported that they had opted out 
of the default stated that one reason they did so was to avoid 
this (nonexistent) fee.153 
Consumer misperception here is driven in part by the com-
plexity of the overdraft policy default and of the fees that apply 
when different forms of payment are denied. The fact that the 
policy default applies to ATM and nonrecurring debit transac-
tions but not checks and recurring payments is not intuitive, es-
pecially given that some banks call the debit cards they issue 
“check cards.” The fact that some debit card denials do not result 
in a fee is not obvious, given that when a check or recurring deb-
it transaction is denied, both the merchant and the bank can 
charge the consumer a fee, and some prepaid debit cards carry 
declined-transaction fees.154 But banks also stoke confusion with 
overdraft marketing materials that make claims such as: “You 
can protect yourself from . . . fees normally charged to you by 
merchants for returned items,” or “The Bounce Overdraft Pro-
gram was designed to protect you from the cost . . . of having 
your transactions denied.”155 
iii) Exploiting and engendering confusion.  Confusion is one 
mechanism that can make defaults sticky, but it also can lead 
consumers to inadvertently opt out. Polls suggest that many ac-
count holders treated by their banks as having opted out did not 
 
  152  Center for Responsible Lending, Consumer Federation of America, and National 
Consumer Law Center, Comments at 15 (cited in note 78). Consumers who believe that 
they must opt out to avoid bouncing checks may feel compelled to opt out, given that in 
most states bouncing a check is a criminal offense and can even result in imprisonment. 
See  Bad Check Laws by States (National Check Fraud Center 2011), online at 
http://www.ckfraud.org/penalties.html#criminal (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  153  Center for Responsible Lending, Consumer Federation of America, and National 
Consumer Law Center, Comments at 15 (cited in note 78). 
  154 See Sandra Block, Prepaid Card Fees Can Hurt: If You Don’t Choose Carefully, 
They Can Squeeze You Dry, USA Today 1B (Jan 18, 2011). 
  155 Center for Responsible Lending, Banks Collect Overdraft Opt-Ins at *1 (cited in 
note 148).  
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intend to opt out. In a Spring 2012 survey, taken almost two 
years after the policy default became effective, over half of the 
consumers who reported having paid an overdraft fee on an 
ATM or nonrecurring debit transaction in the prior year stated 
that they did not believe they had opted out of the policy default 
and into overdraft coverage.156 Eight percent did not know 
whether they had agreed to overdraft coverage.157 Both the ex-
istence of substantial numbers of consumers who do not know 
their opt-out status and the fact that banks treat consumers who 
do not believe they opted out as having done so indicate that 
here,158 transaction confusion, rather than favoring the default, 
operates to favor opting out. 
The complexity of the policy default and of overdraft gener-
ally, explained above,159 as well as bank presentation of the opt-
out choice, contribute to this confusion. When consumers are 
orally asked to opt out, confusion may be especially high. One 
consumer reported that, after calling her bank about an unre-
lated matter, the representative 
very quickly noted that I didn’t have any overdraft protec-
tion and that she’d go ahead and do me the favor of adding 
overdraft protection to my checking account . . . . She never 
asked if I wanted the service or even gave me a chance to 
give her my opinion on the matter.160 
Bank employees say that their employers require them to sell 
overdraft coverage using deceptive tactics and that consumers 
who are convinced to opt out do not understand what has hap-
pened.161 These tactics are likely concentrated on frequent 
overdrafters; at least one bank offered employees a bonus for 
 
  156  The PEW Center on the States, Overdraft America at *4 (cited in note 126).  
  157 Id. 
  158  Although surveys can suffer from biased responses, it is unlikely that consumers 
would understate their frequency of opting out. Social desirability bias, if present at all, 
would favor opting out because bank marketing made the argument that consumers 
ought to opt out, and no constituency that favored sticking with the default was particu-
larly active in the media. 
  159  See notes 117–24 and accompanying text. 
  160 Popken,  Chase Just Goes Ahead (cited in note 141). 
  161  See Ben Popken, Get Customers to Sign Up for Overdraft Fees or Get Fired (Con-
sumerist Aug 3, 2010), online at http://consumerist.com/2010/08/03/getting-fired-for-not 
-tricking-customers-into-overdraft-fees (visited Sept 11, 2013); Ben Popken, Branch 
Manager Quits rather than Trick Bank Customers into Signing Up for Overdrafts (Con-
sumerist Aug 13, 2010), online at http://consumerist.com/2010/08/13/rather-than-trick-
bank-customers-into-signing-up-for-overdrafts-branch-manager-quits (visited Sept 11, 
2013).  
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convincing prior users of overdraft coverage to opt out of the 
default.162 
iv) Making the choice visible.  Although another common 
barrier to opting out of defaults is invisibility, the choice to opt 
out of the overdraft default is highly visible. The law requires 
that the choice to opt out be presented in a notice segregated 
from other account information.163 The intent was to prevent 
banks from switching the default rule in fine-print terms to 
which consumers blindly consent, but the effect is also to defuse 
the invisibility mechanism that might otherwise make the de-
fault sticky. To consumers who ignore the opt-out notice, banks 
direct reams of marketing; as noted above, frequent overdrafters 
may even be called or approached in person. Thus, the policy de-
fault garners no traction through the invisibility mechanism. 
b) Neutralizing and flipping judgment and decision biases.   
i) Repositioning loss aversion and the endowment effect.  
Loss aversion and the endowment effect can contribute to the 
power of defaults, but banks use a variety of methods to reposi-
tion these biases to induce opting out. 
First, banks frame opting out as a gain. In their communi-
cations with consumers, banks refer to opting out of the policy 
default as “opting in” to a bank’s “overdraft service.”164 Thus, 
opting out of the default is framed as gaining a service rather 
than losing an endowed reference position, so that loss aversion 
and the endowment effect are not triggered to support the policy 
default. 
Instead, banks frame the policy default as a loss. At the re-
quest of the banking industry,165 the regulations allowed banks 
to obtain consumer consent to opting out prior to the effective 
date of the new default.166 Banks capitalized on this, heavily 
pitching existing account holders on the right to opt out prior to 
the operation of the new rule.167 Thus, at the time consumers 
were asked to agree to overdraft coverage, they were being 
 
  162 See Ray Birch, Iowa CU’s Face-to-Face Pitch Boosts Opt-Ins, 14 Credit Union J 
11, 11 (May 31, 2010). 
  163  12 CFR § 205.17(b)(1)(i)–(ii). 
  164 The regulations use the same language. See, for example, 12 CFR § 205.17 (re-
peatedly referring to opting out of the default as “opt[ing] in” to overdraft coverage for 
ATM and nonrecurring debit transactions, and to overdraft coverage as a “service”). 
  165  See 74 Fed Reg at 59047. 
  166  12 CFR § 205.17(c)(1) Supp I.  
  167 See, for example, Sullivan, Banks’ Hard Sell (cited in note 117); Martin and 
Lieber, Overdraft Open Season, NY Times at B1 (cited in note 90).  
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asked to take action to preserve the status quo and avoid losing 
a currently endowed position. In their marketing, banks explicit-
ly invoked loss aversion to encourage opting out with copy such 
as “Don’t lose your ATM and Debit Card Overdraft Protection”168 
and “STAY PROTECTED with [ ] ATM and Debit Card Over-
draft Coverage,”169 and by framing the overdraft coverage choices 
as follows: 
FIGURE 1.  EXCERPTS FROM BANK OVERDRAFT DEFAULT OPT-OUT 
FORM170 
  
 
or 
 
 
One bank employee frankly explained that nearly all customers 
could be convinced to opt out by presenting a failure to opt out 
as a change: “All you have to do to get an almost definite yes is 
explain that opting in [to overdraft coverage] will keep their ac-
count exactly the way it is now. People are scared of change so 
they’ll opt in [to overdraft coverage] to avoid change.”171  
Even after the new default rule became operative, in some-
what Orwellian fashion, bank marketing has continued to play 
on loss aversion and the endowment effect. For example, as of 
this writing, nearly three years after the policy default became 
effective, one bank’s online banking webpage continues to state, 
“Your . . . Checking account has a feature called [ ] Debit Card 
Overdraft Coverage . . . . Don’t worry, there’s no fee to keep the 
coverage.”172 
 
  168  Don’t Lose Your ATM & Debit Card Overdraft Protection (Lapeer County Bank & Trust 
Co 2010), online at http://www.lcbt.com/2747/mirror/debitcardandatmoverdraftprotection.htm 
(visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  169  Stay Protected with SharePlus at *1 (cited in note 150).  
  170  Id (advertising the benefits of overdraft coverage). 
  171 Sullivan,  Banks’ Hard Sell (cited in note 117). 
  172  Chase Debit Card Overdraft Coverage (JP Morgan Chase Bank 2013), online at 
http://demo.chase.com/presents/preview/pnt/non_pnt/add_overdraft_coverage.html (visited  
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More subtly, bank marketing works directly on the query ef-
fects173 believed to underlie loss aversion, in two ways. First, 
banks describe the benefits of opting out of the default before 
presenting consumers with the default itself. Second, in the 
written or online form banks provide for consumers to opt out, 
they first present the choice to opt out (phrased as a positive-
thought-invoking “Yes”) and then present the choice to stick 
with the default (phrased as a negative-thought-invoking 
“No”).174 By channeling the consumer’s decision process to con-
sider the benefits of the opt-out position first rather than consid-
ering the benefits of the default first, bank marketing flips query 
effects to encourage consumers to opt out of the overdraft 
default. 
ii) Playing on discounting to favor opting out.  When the 
costs of opting out of a default are immediate and certain, and 
the gains in the future and speculative, discounting favors stick-
ing with the default. But in the case of overdraft, discounting 
may encourage opting out. 
The benefits of opting out of the overdraft policy default are 
immediate and appear certain. In addition to stopping the over-
draft-marketing barrage described above, there are two benefits 
consumers may seek when opting out. First, consumers may 
seek access to overdraft funds immediately. Because account 
holders can opt out of the policy default at any time, a bank can, 
at its discretion, provide them with funds as soon as they opt 
out.175 Second, consumers may seek present peace of mind176 that 
they will have access to cash if they encounter an emergency in 
 
Sept 11, 2013) (emphasis added). See also inSight *3 (San Bernardino School Employees 
Federal Credit Union July 2010), online at http://www.sbsefcu.org/newsletters 
/SBInsight_Summer2010.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013) (“[D]on’t worry, there’s no fee to 
keep the coverage available and the fee will apply only if you use it.”) (citation omitted). 
  173 Recall that “query effects” refers to the fact that people tend to generate more 
answers to the first question they ask themselves than the second, and they routinely 
ask themselves about the benefits of the reference point before considering the benefits 
of an alternative. See note 42 and accompanying text.  
  174 This reverses the order suggested by the Federal Reserve Board’s Model Form. 
For the relevant portion of the form, see text accompanying note 189. 
  175 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Electronic Fund Trans-
fers, 75 Fed Reg 31665, 31667 (2010) (amending 12 CFR § 205.17) (noting that a con-
sumer could wait “until the time the [overdraft] service is needed” to opt out of the de-
fault). 
  176  Stay Protected with SharePlus at *1 (cited in note 150) (“Maintain peace of mind 
with Triple-Protection.”); Standard Overdraft Services: Are You In? (cited in note 121) 
(“Enjoy the peace of mind of knowing your checks, debits, and payments are automatical-
ly honored by setting up an Overdraft Protection Plan.”).  
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the future. Bank marketing suggests that opting out will provide 
this, with scripts suggesting, for example, that “No Bounce Ad-
vantage” can be a “lifesaver” in case of an “[u]nexpected car re-
pair, maybe when traveling” or for “[m]edical expenses, perhaps 
a prescription”177 or “Privilege Pay works like a safety net for 
your checking account . . . so you don’t get left stranded at a gas 
station.”178 Such statements make it appear as if there were no 
uncertainty about this benefit, even though, as previously noted, 
banks deny about a third of transactions that would overdraw 
an account.179 Thus, neither the financial nor the psychological 
benefits of opting out are subject to discounting due to time or 
uncertainty. 
The costs of opting out of this policy default, on the other 
hand, are uncertain and in the future. Banks frame opting out of 
the default and into the bank’s overdraft program as a “free” 
perk.180 Consumers tend to accept “free” offers—offers with no 
tangible up-front cost—without pausing to consider true long-
term or intangible costs.181 Bank marketing may even confuse 
consumers into believing that not only is opting out of the de-
fault “free,” but so too is using overdraft coverage once the con-
sumer has opted out.182 Oral sales pitches in particular can gloss 
 
  177  Bounce Advantage (Peoples Bank 2013) (on file with The University of Chicago 
Law Review). 
  178  Privilege Pay (Farmers Insurance Group Federal Credit Union 2013), online at 
https://www.figfcu.com/print.php?id=610 (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
  179  See Lieber and Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards, NY Times at A20 (cited in 
note 77). 
  180  See, for example, Overdraft Protection (Capital One 2013), online at 
http://www.capitalone.com/bank/overdraft-protection (visited Sept 11, 2013) (“Opting in 
is free and easy.”); Check Card Overdraft Protection for Your Wescom Checking Account 
(Wescom Credit Union 2011), online at https://www.wescom.org/accounts/whyoptinover 
draftprotection.asp (visited Sept 11, 2013) (“Why Opt in to Check Card Overdraft Protec-
tion? It’s Free.”). 
  181 See Kristina Shampanier, Nina Mazar, and Dan Ariely, Zero as a Special Price: 
The True Value of Free Products, 26 Mktg Sci 742, 743 (2007). See also David Adam 
Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 NM L Rev 49, 69–71 (2008) (discussing decep-
tiveness of “free” offers); Chris Anderson, Free: The Future of a Radical Price 59 (Hyperi-
on 2009): 
A single penny doesn’t really mean anything to us economically. So why does it 
have so much impact? The answer is that it makes us think about the choice. 
That alone is a disincentive to continue. It’s as if our brains were wired to raise 
a flag every time we’re confronted with a price. This is the “is it worth it?” flag. 
If you charge a price, any price, we are forced to ask ourselves if we really want 
to open our wallets. But if the price is zero, that flag never goes up and the de-
cision just got easier. 
  182 See Martha C. White, We Paid Almost $30 Billion in Overdraft Fees in 2011 
(Time Jan 3, 2012), online at http://business.time.com/2012/01/03/we-paid-almost-30  
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over the fees for overdrawing.183 Certainly no bank explains that, 
as noted above, unpaid overdrafts are the primary reason banks 
involuntarily close and refuse to open checking accounts, mean-
ing that one potential cost of opting out is loss of checking-
account privileges. 
Moreover, overdraft fees are not usually visible or certain at 
the time when the overdraft occurs. Banks generally do not dis-
close the fee at the ATM or point of sale,184 and it is difficult for 
consumers to know whether they are overdrawing. Consumers 
may not know the account balance their bank will assign them 
at any moment because deposits take varying amounts of time 
to clear, holds can be placed on account funds, banks reorder 
transactions within a single day, and account balance state-
ments can be inaccurate.185 Consumers only see the actual over-
draft fees charged sometime in the future, often not until they 
receive their monthly statement, and only if they read the 
statement.186 Ninety percent of consumers polled in 2012 who 
had incurred an overdraft fee in the prior year stated that they 
 
-billion-in-overdraft-fees-in-2011 (visited Sept 11, 2013) (quoting Susan Weinstock of 
PEW’s finding from focus group interviews that “[m]any people think that choosing the 
bank’s ‘protection’ means that they won’t be charged an overdraft fee”). 
  183 See Laura Northrup, TD Bank Sells Overdraft Protection as a “Free” Service 
(Consumerist Aug 11, 2010), online at http://consumerist.com/2010/08/11/td-bank-sells 
-overdraft-protection-as-a-free-service (visited Sept 11, 2013) (reporting that a consumer 
received a phone call from a bank representative who told him that that the bank’s 
“overdraft protection” was “free” and only mentioned fees by saying that the fees for us-
ing the service “would stay the same”). 
  184  Cashman, et al, FDIC Study at iii (cited in note 79). 
  185 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Bank Fees at *21 (cited in 
note 149) (explaining that transaction clearing time varies); id at *62 (“Debit card indus-
try representatives explained that the account balance that is used to authorize a debit-
card transaction—and which would be displayed to the consumer—may not necessarily 
reflect the true balance in the consumer’s checking account at the time of the transac-
tion.”); Cashman, et al, FDIC Study at iv (cited in note 79) (explaining the bank practice 
of processing withdrawals on a single day from largest to smallest, which maximizes the 
number of withdrawals that will overdraft the account and overdraft fee revenue). But 
see Gutierrez v Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 730 F Supp 2d 1080, 1124 (ND Cal 2010) (holding 
transaction reordering for the purpose of inflating overdraft fees to be a fraudulent prac-
tice in violation of California state law).  
  186  The PEW Center on the States, Overdraft America at *7 (cited in note 126) (find-
ing that reading an account statement was the most common way consumers discovered 
that they had overdrawn their accounts, with about a quarter learning of the overdraft 
this way). See also Bob Sullivan, Gotcha Capitalism: How Hidden Fees Rip You Off Eve-
ry Day—and What You Can Do about It 60 (Ballantine 2007) (quoting a bank employee 
as stating: “Our focus is to get you to start using the debit cards so you can charge up 
those [overdraft] fees, because the purchases that you make will not show in your ac-
count until many days later”).  
1196   The University of Chicago Law Review  [80:1155 
    
overdrew their account by mistake and were surprised by the fee 
when they became aware of it.187 
Consumers do have the right to opt back into the default, 
but once they have opted out of the default the transaction costs 
of opting back in are immediate. Because most people—even 
those who have opted out of the default and even those who have 
overdrawn frequently in the past—do not expect to overdraw 
their accounts,188 the benefits of opting back in are uncertain and 
in the future. Discounting therefore can lead to sticking with the 
opt-out position. 
  iii) Framing the choice to invoke an action bias.  Defaults 
can sometimes garner adherents through omission bias and re-
gret aversion. But banks are able to neutralize omission bias 
and even invoke an action bias in the direction of opting out of 
the overdraft policy default. As explained above, banks place 
new and online-banking customers in a mandated-choice scenar-
io, forcing them to actively select the default or the opt-out posi-
tion. Even when banks do not require consumers to make a 
choice, they typically present the choice in a manner that im-
plies that the consumer must make a choice. In this respect, 
banks are following the model form developed by regulators, 
which appears as follows: 
FIGURE 2.  EXCERPT FROM MODEL OVERDRAFT DEFAULT OPT-
OUT FORM189 
 
 
Even if the consumer wants to stick with the default, this 
presentation implies that action is required on the consumer’s 
part. Without the option to do nothing, the omission bias does 
not lead consumers to the default position. 
 
  187  The PEW Center on the States, Overdraft America at *4 (cited in note 126). 
  188  See note 129 and accompanying text. 
  189 12 CFR § 205, Appendix A-9 (cited in note 119). See also 12 CFR § 205.17(d)(3) 
Supp I (“Institutions may, but are not required, to provide a signature line or check box 
where the consumer can indicate that he or she declines to opt in.”).  
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While the model form implicitly sends the message that 
consumers must make an overdraft-coverage choice, bank mar-
keting makes that message explicit. For example, banks instruct 
account holders that they must take action using language such 
as: “To keep your account operating smoothly . . . [and] [t]o avoid 
any interruptions in how we service your account, we need to 
hear from you”190 and “Urgent notice regarding your .  .  . Deb-
it/ATM Card. Your immediate response is needed! . . . Your sig-
nature is required.”191 By framing the choice as one that con-
sumers must make, the message is that consumers are 
responsible for inaction. Rather than failing to act due to omis-
sion bias, consumers may anticipate that if a poor consequence 
comes to pass, they will regret having failed to take any action. 
iv) Reducing procrastination.  Procrastination can lead peo-
ple to stick with the default, but banks work to reduce or elimi-
nate it. As explained above, banks force new customers and ex-
isting account holders who wish to use online banking to choose 
between the default and opt-out positions, so procrastination is 
not an option. For other existing account holders, particularly 
those approached in person or by phone and asked to make a 
choice, procrastination may not appear to be an option. Bank 
marketing to existing account holders emphasized the effective 
date of the new default rule as if it were a deadline for opting 
out, presenting the choice as an urgent one that could not be de-
layed beyond that point: 
 
  190 Center for Responsible Lending, Banks Collect Overdraft Opt-Ins at *1 (cited in 
note 148) (emphasis omitted). 
  191  Urgent Notice Regarding Your Public Service Credit Union Debit/ATM Card *1 (Pub-
lic Service Credit Union 2010), online at https://www.mypscu.com/docs/odpletteronline.pdf 
(visited Sept 11, 2013).  
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FIGURE 3.  EXCERPT FROM BANK MARKETING OF ATM AND 
NONRECURRING DEBIT TRANSACTION OVERDRAFT COVERAGE192 
 
 
When delay is or appears impermissible, procrastination does 
not bolster the default. 
In addition, some banks may provide consumers with incen-
tives to overcome procrastination. Firms that offer overdraft-
marketing services have advised banks to provide gifts or cash 
offers to prior frequent overdrafters to encourage them to re-
spond to the bank’s request that they opt out of the default (re-
gardless of whether that response is to check the box opting out 
or the box keeping the default).193 In addition to overcoming pro-
crastination, such incentives to make an active decision likely 
increase the visibility of the choice to opt out and work against 
the omission bias. 
c) Shaping preferences.  In the context of overdraft, banks 
have undermined the implicit advice and experience mecha-
nisms through which defaults can sometimes gain adherents. 
Bank presentation of the policy default, following the model 
form displayed above, does not reveal which is the default posi-
tion, consenting to overdraft coverage or not consenting. Some 
banks further obscure that the default is a default. One bank’s 
opt-out form claims that a decision to opt out is “effective 
 
  192 Jim Bruene, Debit Card Overdraft Protection: 2 Steps Forward, 1.9 Back (Net-
banker July 13, 2010), online at http://www.netbanker.com/2010/07/debit_card_overdraft 
_protection_2_steps_forward_19_back.html (visited Sept 11, 2013) (copied from the then-
homepage of Horizons North Credit Union).  
  193  See Center for Responsible Lending, et al, Comments on Regulations DD and E—
Overdraft *9 (Consumer Federation of America Mar 30, 2010), online at http://www 
.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/FRB_Overdraft_Comment_3_30 
_10.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
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immediately,” but for those who choose to stick with the de-
fault “your account(s) will reflect your decision on or before the 
second business day after your decision has been submitted.”194 
The same bank’s flyer states “if . . . you don’t want your every-
day debit card transactions authorized when you don’t have suf-
ficient funds in your account, your banker can remove this ser-
vice from your account.”195 By stating that overdraft coverage 
needs to be removed and that a decision to decline it is not effec-
tive for two days, the bank creates the misimpression that hav-
ing overdraft coverage is the default. The effect is to rob the pol-
icy default of any implicit advice it might otherwise have 
carried, and to subtly convey advice to opt out. 
In addition, banks explicitly advise consumers to opt out. 
For example, several banks are using advertising copy that tells 
their customers: “The majority of our members prefer having 
this service.”196 Particularly for consumers who are confused by 
overdraft options, following the herd may seem like sound 
advice. 
Finally, as explained above, existing account holders were 
pressed to opt out of the policy default before it came into effect 
and thus before they experienced it. New customers must make 
a decision at account opening, possibly before they have experi-
enced it. Without living with the default and perhaps discover-
ing that purchases can be foregone or cheaper sources of short-
term credit are available, consumers are not induced to choose 
the default due to experience. 
None of this analysis tells us whether those consumers who 
opt out of the overdraft policy default are better off with over-
draft coverage or would be better off without it. People often 
make the right decisions for the “wrong” reasons. Someone who 
is motivated by loss aversion to opt out, for example, might be 
better off even though she did not engage in a rational weighing 
 
  194 Screenshot on file with author. Relevant excerpt from screenshot also available 
at Oscar Valles, Chase Debit Card Overdraft Coverage and Chase Overdraft Protection 
Program (Oscar Valles July 17, 2010), online at http://oscarvalles.wordpress.com/2010 
/07/17/chase-debit-card-overdraft-coverage-and-chase-overdraft-protection-program (vis-
ited Sept 11, 2013) (describing one customer’s experience of still being charged overdraft 
fees after opting out, and showing an image of the relevant text). 
  195 Center for Responsible Lending, et al, Comments on Regulations DD and E—
Overdraft at Appendix (cited in note 193). See also Chase Debit at *1 (cited in note 77). 
  196  Important Information Affecting Your Overdraft Services (ABCO Federal Credit 
Union 2013), online at http://www.goabco.org/rege.cfm (visited Sept 11, 2013); Important 
Information Affecting Your Checking Account (Athol Credit Union 2009), online at 
http://www.atholcreditunion.com/home/personal/odp (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
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process first, just as someone who sticks with the default due to 
procrastination might be better off, and both will have been 
spared the time and energy of determining the rationally “cor-
rect” decision. To judge whether people are making welfare-
enhancing choices requires more than knowing how they arrived 
at their choices. 
What this analysis does tell us is that, once regulators have 
decided that people would be better off in a particular position, 
making that position the default will not necessarily achieve 
this end. If the regulators who put the overdraft policy default in 
place are correct that very few consumers benefit from debit and 
ATM transactions that overdraw their accounts and that past 
frequent overdrafters in particular would be better off without 
overdraft coverage for ATM and debit transactions, then the pol-
icy default has not been particularly successful in increasing 
consumer welfare. 
B.  Boundary Conditions on Using Policy Defaults 
How generalizable is the overdraft case? Are lessons from 
the overdraft experience transferable to other contexts? Four 
factors appear to contribute to the slipperiness of the overdraft 
default: (1) one party opposes the default strongly enough to in-
cur costs trying to make the default slippery, (2) that opposed 
party has access to the party the default aims to aid (typically a 
consumer) when the consumer is in a position to opt out, (3) the 
consumer finds the decision confusing, and (4) the consumer 
lacks clear preexisting preferences about the decision. Ironically, 
the last two factors also contribute to the stickiness of defaults. 
When consumers do not understand their options well and have 
weak or conflicted preferences, defaults are more likely to influ-
ence outcomes. But firm actions to manipulate altering rules 
and shape the frame in which the consumer perceives the de-
fault are likely to have more influence on consumers in these 
conditions as well. 
1.  A sufficiently opposed party. 
The key difference between the retirement savings plan-
participation default and the overdraft default is the presence of 
an opposed party. In the retirement savings case, no party with 
access to the employee opposes the default. Retirement savings  
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plan service providers generally benefit when more employees 
stick with the participation default197 and employers have some 
incentives to encourage participation.198 Banks, on the other 
hand, lose overdraft revenue when consumers, and frequent 
overdrafters in particular, opt out. They therefore have a strong 
profit motive to induce account holders to opt out. Further, the 
revenue banks could lose is apparently large enough, and thus 
their opposition to the policy default strong enough, to compen-
sate for the cost of efforts to steer consumers out of the default. 
A number of policy default contexts look like the retirement-
savings context in this respect. For example, when Washington 
State citizens register their cars, by default a $5 contribution to 
the state’s parks is added, meaning the citizen must opt out if 
she does not want to make the contribution.199 No party involved 
has any interest in inducing citizens to opt out, so this default is 
likely to be sticky. A similar situation is presented by the Dodd-
Frank Act’s200 new property-taxes and hazard-insurance-
escrowing default rule for certain high-cost mortgages.201 Es-
crowing is legally required for the first year of the loan, after 
which it becomes a default from which borrowers can opt out.202 
In the past, lenders offered non-escrowing loans to lower the ap-
parent monthly cost of the mortgage as part of the loan sales 
pitch.203 Because no party has an interest in making mortgage 
costs appear artificially low a year into the loan, the new escrow-
ing default is likely to be sticky. 
Other policy default contexts are closer to the overdraft de-
fault on this score. The following are three examples where 
 
  197  Plan service-provider compensation often increases when more employees partic-
ipate or when more assets are under their management. See Deloitte Consulting LLP, 
Inside the Structure of Defined Contribution/401(k) Plan Fees: A Study Assessing the 
Mechanics of the ‘All-In’ Fee *5, 30 (Investment Company Institute Nov 2011), online at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_11_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
  198 Higher participation levels benefit employers because participation increases 
employee productivity and retention, particularly for those employees whom employers 
value more. See William E. Even and David A. Macpherson, Benefits and Productivity, in 
Olivia S. Mitchell, et al, eds, Benefits for the Workplace of the Future 43, 48–49 (Pennsyl-
vania 2003). 
  199  Wash Rev Code § 46.16A.090(3). 
  200  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). 
  201  Dodd-Frank Act § 1461, 124 Stat at 2178. 
  202  12 CFR § 226.35(b)(3)(iii). 
  203  See Jack M. Guttentag, Should Escrows Be Mandatory? (The Mortgage Professor 
July 2, 2007), online at http://www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20-%20Escrows/should_escrows 
_be_mandatory.htm (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
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defaults face highly motivated opposed parties: First, almost 
all states by default allow shareholders to collect damages from 
the firm’s directors if those directors fail to perform their duties 
with care.204 To minimize their potential liability, directors have 
successfully inserted a provision waiving shareholders’ default 
rights to collect damages into 99 of the top Fortune 100 compa-
nies’ articles of incorporation.205 Second, in the privacy arena, 
one of the more prominent policy defaults206 that has been pro-
posed is a do-not-track default such that web user online activity 
could not be tracked without affirmative user consent.207 Be-
cause many websites use tracking data or sell it (or sell access to 
third parties that can track users through the website), typical-
ly for targeted-marketing purposes,208 these websites can be 
 
  204 See Tamar Frankel, What Default Rules Teach Us about Corporations; What Un-
derstanding Corporations Teaches Us about Default Rules, 33 Fla St U L Rev 697, 699–
700 (2006). 
  205 See J. Robert Brown Jr and Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, 
Waiver of Liability Provisions, and the Race to the Bottom, 42 Ind L Rev 285, 309–10 
(2009).  
  206 Many other privacy-protective policy defaults have been proposed. For example, 
a bill pending in the California legislature would require social networking sites to de-
fault consumers into “do not share” privacy settings, such that consumers would have to 
opt out to give others access to their postings. Social Networking Privacy Act, SB 242, 
2011–2012 Cal State Legis (2011) (refused as of June 2, 2011). A bill pending in Con-
gress would require companies that collect data about consumers online to exclude sensi-
tive information like medical condition or religious affiliation by default, such that con-
sumers would need to opt out for this information to be collected. Commercial Privacy 
Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S 799, 112th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 12, 2011). 
  207  In the matter of Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No 071-0170, *20 (Dec 20, 2007) 
(concurring statement of Jon Leibowitz) (“Perhaps the best solution for consumers is a 
change in the widespread opt-out default for . . . tracking mechanisms to an opt-in de-
fault to allow consumers affirmatively to consent.”). However, the Commission’s most 
recent report in this area is unclear as to whether it believes do-not-track should be the 
default, track-me should be the default from which consumers could then opt out, or con-
sumers should be required to make a choice between do-not-track and track-me. Com-
pare  Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for 
Businesses and Policymakers *1 (Federal Trade Commission Mar 2012), online at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013) (suggest-
ing that privacy should be “the ‘default setting’ for commercial data practices”), with id 
at 52–55 (suggesting that consumers be given the “choice” not to be tracked for certain 
purposes).  
  Further, what a do-not-track policy default would mean is unclear. Open questions 
include whether it would apply to websites users visit or only to third parties that use 
those websites to track users, whether it would prohibit collection of data for all purposes 
or for only specific purposes, and whether it would permit collection where the data is 
anonymized. See generally id (suggesting a regulatory framework for internet privacy). 
For illustrative purposes, this Article uses a simplified construct of a do-not-track policy 
default: no tracking by any party for any purpose without explicit user consent.  
  208  See, for example, James Temple, Privacy Worries Persist on Tracking, San Fran-
cisco Chronicle D1 (Mar 7, 2012) (“Targeting ads based on search queries, sites visited,  
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expected to strive to make such defaults slippery. Third, the 
insurance exchanges that will soon be established under the Af-
fordable Care Act209 may either allow individuals who apply to 
an exchange to be enrolled in a default plan or offer these appli-
cants a small set of default plans to choose from.210 Competing 
health insurance plan sellers will have an interest in seeing that 
individuals opt out of the default plans and into their competing 
plans. 
A contrasting example is the Credit Card Accountability Re-
sponsibility and Disclosure Act’s211 (Credit CARD Act) new policy 
default that, much like the overdraft default, requires card issu-
ers to obtain express consumer consent before charging over-the-
limit fees.212 Issuers oppose the default, but apparently not 
strongly enough to spend much effort steering consumers out of 
the default. This is because alongside the default are substan-
tive restrictions that, as a practical matter, cap over-the-limit 
fees at $35 per account holder per month.213 Most issuers have 
determined that the restricted fees they could earn if consumers 
 
stories read and social connections forms the core of the multimillion-dollar business 
models of many online companies, including Google, Yahoo and Facebook.”). 
  209  Affordable Care Act § 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat at 173. The other policy default under 
the Affordable Care Act is a health care plan automatic enrollment default for new full-
time hires of large employers. Affordable Care Act § 1511, 124 Stat at 252. However, un-
til regulations governing the characteristics of these default plans are released that 
make clear the costs of these plans to employers as compared to the costs employers 
would incur if employees opt into another plan offered by the employer or out of employ-
er-sponsored health insurance entirely, it is unclear whether employers will oppose this 
default. 
  210  See, for example, Brendan S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchanges: 
Choice, Defaults, and the Unconnected, 44 Conn L Rev 1099, 1112 (2012) (“A regulator 
can choose a default such that a person can ‘one-click’ for default coverage of a specified 
quality and price, and make the default option a prominent option of the exchange web-
site.”); Choice Architecture: Design Decisions That Affect Consumers’ Health Plan Choices 
*10–12 (Kleimann Communication Group and Consumers Union July 9, 2012), online at 
http://consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Choice_Architecture_Report.pdf 
(visited Sept 11, 2013) (describing how current computerized health plan chooser tools 
similar to those that the exchanges will use usually provide consumers with a short de-
fault list of plans on the first computer screen, selected using metrics chosen by the ex-
change and a few pieces of information about the consumer). 
  211 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit 
CARD Act), Pub L No 111-24, 123 Stat 1734. 
  212  12 CFR § 226.56(b). 
  213 See 12 CFR § 226.52(b)(1) (stating that the fee must reflect actual costs or fall 
within a safe harbor dollar figure of $25, or in some cases $35); 12 CFR § 226.52(b)(2)(i) 
(prohibiting the fee from being larger than the amount by which the credit limit was ex-
ceeded); 12 CFR § 226.56(j)(1)(i) (limiting card issuers such that no more than one fee 
can be charged each billing cycle).  
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opted out are not worth the cost of engaging in maneuvers de-
signed to make the default slippery.214 
2.  Access to consumers by that opposed party. 
Another element that is key to the slipperiness of the over-
draft policy default is one shared by the retirement savings par-
ticipation default—access to consumers when they are choosing 
whether to opt out or stick with the default. In addition to the 
raw ability to communicate with employees and account holders 
at home—and, in the case of employers and plan service provid-
ers, at the workplace—employers and banks have relationships 
with their employees and their customers that make it likely 
that the latter will pay attention to the communication. An ac-
count holder who sees that it is her own bank that is sending the 
communication is likely to open and at least skim the email or 
postal mail, scan the pop-up screen, answer the telephone, or lis-
ten to the bank representative when approached at the branch. 
Because the consumer can opt out by dropping a postcard back 
in the mail, clicking a link on the email or pop-up screen, or say-
ing “yes” on the telephone or in the branch, the bank has an op-
portunity to frame the consumer’s thinking about the default at 
a time when she can opt out. Employers and plan service pro-
viders can likewise use their access to encourage employees to 
stick with the participation defaults at the time the employee is 
presented with retirement-savings choices. 
Opposing parties do not always have such access to the par-
ties that policy defaults aim to assist. For example, certain reli-
gious organizations might oppose a sex education class policy de-
fault for schoolchildren215 or a do-not-resuscitate default for the 
terminally ill.216 But these opposed parties will only have access 
 
  214 See, for example, Maria Aspan, Law Hits Home as Cards Opt Out of Overlimit 
Fees, 174 Am Banker 1 (Aug 10, 2009) (explaining that card issuers are eliminating over-
the-limit fees because the prospective returns are no longer worth the costs to issuers).  
  215 See US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, New York: Some Catholic 
Officials Urge Parents to Opt Out of Mandated Sex Education (The Body Aug 11, 2011), 
online at http://www.thebody.com/content/63488/new-york-some-catholic-officials-urge 
-parents-to-o.html (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  216 See Erik DeLue, Default Medicine: What We Need for EOL Care (Today’s Hospi-
talist Feb 2011), online at http://todayshospitalist.com/index.php?b=articles_read 
&cnt=1172 (visited Sept 11, 2013) (advocating making do-not-resuscitate the default for 
the terminally ill); Daniel J. Brauner, Reconsidering Default Medicine, 58 J Am Geriat-
rics Socy 599, 600 (2010) (suggesting changing the default from life-sustaining feeding to 
comfort feeding for the terminally ill).  
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to their members and are unlikely to influence the opt-out deci-
sions of others. 
Other situations are likely to present opposing parties with 
significant opportunities to circumvent the altering rules in-
tended to make policy defaults sticky and to shape the frame in 
which the other party perceives the policy default. Corporate di-
rectors draft amendments to articles of incorporation and control 
when amendments come up for a shareholder vote, and so can 
frame the context in which shareholders decide whether to opt 
out of their default right to collect damages from directors who 
violate the duty of care.217 Websites could take the liberty of 
framing a do-not-track default each time users who had not opt-
ed out attempted to access the websites.218 
Even without a formal link, opposing firms can sometimes 
obtain access to the other party during her opt-out decision pro-
cess. In the case of default health-insurance plans offered 
through exchanges, if a competing provider has a means of con-
tacting consumers and knows when they are selecting a plan (for 
example, by tracking who has accessed the exchange’s website), 
the competitor might bombard consumers with marketing at 
that point and perhaps offer them an inducement to opt out. 
A scenario with some similarities occurred when Sweden 
started requiring citizens to place a portion of earnings into 
a retirement savings account, which was invested in a low-
cost default fund if the citizen did not affirmatively select 
 
  217  See Brown and Gopalan, 42 Ind L Rev at 312–13 (cited in note 205). 
  218 It might appear that the user’s browser stands between the user and websites, 
given that one way a user could opt out of a do-not-track default might be by changing a 
setting on her browser, which would send a signal to websites conveying the user’s sta-
tus as having opted out. See Do Not Track (Electronic Frontier Foundation), online at 
https://www.eff.org/issues/do-not-track (visited Sept 11, 2013). However, browsers cannot 
prevent tracking. When Microsoft announced that the next version of its browser would 
set do-not-track as the default, firms that track web users promptly announced that they 
would not follow the instruction. See Ryan Singel, IE 10’s “Do Not Track” Default Dies 
Quick Death: Outrage from Advertisers Appears to Have Hobbled Microsoft’s Renegade 
Plan (Ars Technica June 7, 2012), online at http://arstechnica.com/information 
-technology/2012/06/ie-10s-do-not-track-default-dies-quick-death (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
  Even if browsers could prevent tracking, websites could lobby users to opt out of the 
default with respect to their website, provide perks to users who opt out, or even set opt-
ing out as a condition of accessing the site. See Edward J. Janger and Paul M. Schwartz, 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 
Minn L Rev 1219, 1244 (2002) (expressing skepticism that a privacy-protective default 
would be sticky because firms would give consumers incentives to opt out or would condi-
tion the receipt of services on opting out).  
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another fund.219 Firms were not involved in the opt-out process; 
the government administered the program. However, firms en-
gaged in a massive marketing campaign to convince citizens to 
opt out of the default and invest instead in the firms’ funds.220 
Those firms with the most to gain—those offering the highest-
priced funds—were very successful in convincing people to opt 
out of the default and into high-priced funds.221 
3.  Confusing decision environment. 
Another way in which the retirement savings and overdraft 
situations are similar is that consumers find their options con-
fusing. Employees understand their employers’ retirement plans 
and investment options no better than checking account holders 
understand their overdraft options.222 Ironically, consumer con-
fusion facilitates both mechanisms that make defaults sticky 
and the manipulation of those mechanisms that make defaults 
slippery. When consumers understand their options—whether 
due to particular sophistication with the context at hand, help 
from an expert intermediary,223 or because the context is simple 
even for those with limited experience and knowledge—both de-
faults and attempts by firms to manipulate consumers’ opt-out 
 
  219 See Henrik Cronqvist and Richard H. Thaler, Design Choices in Privatized So-
cial-Security Systems: Learning from the Swedish Experience, 94 Am Econ Rev Papers & 
Proc 424, 424 (2004). 
  220  Further, the government advised citizens to make their own choices rather than 
relying on the default fund, see id, thereby removing any implicit advice that might oth-
erwise have favored the default. Citizens were therefore particularly receptive to mar-
keting aimed at convincing them to opt out.  
  221  See Henrik Cronqvist, Advertising and Portfolio Choice *3, 23–26 (unpublished 
dissertation, The University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, 2005), online at 
http://web.econ.unito.it/cerp/Appuntamenti/Conferenza%202005/paper%20e 
%20presentazioni/Cronqvist05.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  222  See, for example, Alan L. Gustman, Thomas L. Steinmeier, and Nahid Tabata-
bai, Do Workers Know about Their Pension Plan Type? Comparing Workers’ and Employ-
ers’ Pension Information, in Annamaria Lusardi, ed, Overcoming the Saving Slump: How 
to Increase the Effectiveness of Financial Education and Savings Programs 47, 59, 61 ta-
ble 2.4 (Chicago 2008) (presenting evidence from 2004 that nearly 40 percent of employ-
ees could not accurately identify whether they had a defined benefit or defined contribu-
tion plan); Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in 
Defined Contribution Saving Plans, 91 Am Econ Rev 79, 96 (2001) (showing that em-
ployees understand the investment options in their defined contribution plans so poorly 
that they often divide their money evenly among the options rather than attempting to 
construct a balanced portfolio).  
  223 See, for example, Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and 
Economic Analysis, 84 Nw U L Rev 542, 557 (1990) (arguing that corporate law defaults 
are so slippery as to be trivial because even small corporations consult attorneys—
experts who understand the default and alternatives to it well).  
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decisions will have weak effects. Bank personnel, for example, 
are likely to have overdraft coverage on their personal accounts 
if and only if they want the actual product offered, no matter the 
default or marketing designed to push consumers out of the de-
fault. On the other hand, when consumers find their options 
opaque, the default might act as a decision-impasse breaker, but 
advice conveyed through marketing might perform the same 
role. 
Many consumers poorly understand their options in many 
decision contexts, so this is not unique to the overdraft and re-
tirement settings. In the privacy arena, consumers are largely 
oblivious to the firm-set defaults that currently exist. Many do 
not know that websites currently track their internet use.224 
Among web users who know they are being tracked, what infor-
mation is collected, who has access to it once it is collected, and 
how it can be used are all frequently mysterious.225 Two-thirds 
are unaware of options they have to limit how much information 
is collected about them,226 and even sophisticated users can find 
it impossible to use those options effectively.227 Putting a do-not-
track policy default in place, even if supported by framing rules 
requiring that consumers be given information explaining the 
default, is unlikely to clarify matters much. The variety of data 
that can be collected through tracking and the ways that data 
 
  224  See Joseph Turow, et al, Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activi-
ties That Enable It *21 table 9 (SSRN Working Paper Series, Sept 29, 2009), online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214 (visited Sept 11, 2013) (finding that only 48 percent of 
users know that their internet use currently can be tracked across multiple websites 
without their consent); Opinion Surveys: What Consumers Have to Say about Infor-
mation Privacy; Hearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer 
Protection of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong, 1st Sess 7–11 (2001) 
(statement of Lee Rainie, Director, Pew Internet & American Life Project) (“[T]he major-
ity of Internet users . . . feel they are anonymous online unless they take affirmative 
steps to disclose information about themselves.”). 
  225 See, for example, Blase Ur, et al, Smart, Useful, Scary, Creepy: Perceptions of 
Online Behavioral Advertising *4–5 (Carnegie Mellon University CyLab Apr, 2 2012), 
online at http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab12007.pdf (visited 
Sept 11, 2013); Aleecia M. McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, An Empirical Study of 
How People Perceive Online Behavioral Advertising *4–8 (Carnegie Mellon University 
CyLab Nov 10, 2009), online at http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports 
/CMUCyLab09015.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013). Most consumers falsely believe that the 
law restricts website use of consumer information significantly. See Turow, et al, Ameri-
cans Reject Tailored Advertising at *21 table 9 (cited in note 224). 
  226 See Kristen Purcell, Joanna Brenner, and Lee Rainie, Search Engine Use 2012 
*3 (Pew Research Center’s  Internet & American Life Project Mar 9, 2012), online at 
http://pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Search_Engine_Use_2012.pdf 
(visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  227  See Leon, et al, Why Johnny Can’t Opt Out at *4 (cited in note 34).  
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can be used and disseminated are too complex. One set of re-
searchers who found that simplifying the language and format-
ting of privacy policies barely improved consumer comprehen-
sion explained it this way: “[E]ven the most readable policies are 
too difficult for most people to understand and even the best pol-
icies are confusing.”228 In the face of consumer confusion, parties 
that oppose a do-not-track default would likely be successful in 
neutralizing or flipping the mechanisms that otherwise could 
make the default stick. 
In the health insurance arena, confusion is just as high, 
suggesting that unopposed defaults will be sticky, but defaults 
opposed by parties with access to consumers will be slippery. 
Health plans can vary along many dimensions, including the 
scope of covered services, participating providers, quality 
measures, and pricing schemes (which include deductibles, co-
pays, and out-of-pocket limits).229 Even limiting consideration to 
the single dimension of pricing would cause consumers to have 
great difficulty determining the best plan for their needs.230 It is 
thus unsurprising that consumers who use computerized tools 
for choosing a health plan usually select a plan from among a 
short default list of plans on the first computer screen.231 When 
the Affordable Care Act’s exchanges are established, efforts by 
opposing insurers to steer consumers to opt out might also be 
powerful. 
4. Preference  uncertainty. 
The fourth reason that efforts by banks to move consumers 
out of the overdraft default have been successful is that consum-
er preferences are weak and/or conflicted. As with confusion, 
preference uncertainty facilitates the operation of mechanisms 
that can increase the power of defaults, but also can increase the 
power of framing that leads consumers to opt out. Again, the 
overdraft and retirement savings decision contexts share this 
feature. Employees know they want to save something for re-
tirement, but because they are conflicted or uncertain about how 
much to save or how to invest it, some do not participate in de-
fined contribution plans unless, through automatic enrollment, a 
 
  228  Aleecia M. McDonald, et al, A Comparative Study of Online Privacy Policies and 
Formats, 5672 Lecture Notes in Comp Sci 37, 50 (2009). 
  229 See  Choice Architecture at *4, 20–25 (cited in note 210). 
  230  See id at *20. 
  231  See id at *15.  
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default contribution rate and investment fund are selected for 
them.232 
Both defaults and efforts to move consumers out of defaults 
are less powerful when consumers have clear, strong prefer-
ences. For example, by the time they complete their application 
for a marriage license, most people will have decided what last 
name they would like to have and so will not be swayed by the 
default.233 In one experiment, low-income tax filers who had part 
of their tax refund placed in a savings vehicle by default were no 
more likely to save than those who received all of their refund 
immediately with an option to affirmatively choose to save.234 
The likely explanation for the powerlessness of the default is 
that, at the time of tax filing, most low-income filers have preex-
isting plans about how they will spend their refunds, meaning 
that their preference to spend rather than save is strong enough 
not to be affected by the default.235 Similarly, internet users with 
strong privacy preferences, when not stymied by the technical 
challenge, are likely to end up in the position they desire regard-
less of whether the default is track-me or do-not-track. 
However, domains in which many consumers lack clear, 
strong preferences are likely to be plentiful. Under the current 
track-me default, users simultaneously say they highly value 
privacy and take virtually no steps to protect it—the so-called 
“privacy paradox.” This is not only because protecting privacy is 
technically difficult but also because users’ own preferences are 
conflicted.236 For web users who are not privacy advocates, trading 
 
  232 See James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian, Reducing the Com-
plexity Costs of 401(k) Participation through Quick Enrollment, in David A. Wise, ed, De-
velopments in the Economics of Aging 57, 58 (Chicago 2009) (finding that, even without 
the participation default, giving employees a way to enroll at a default contribution rate 
with a default investment allocation increased participation rates dramatically). 
  233 See Emens, 74 U Chi L Rev at 769 (cited in note 23) (noting that people have 
strong feelings about whether to keep or change their names); id at 812–16 (explaining 
that the social norm that a woman should take her husband’s last name is much more 
powerful than the legal default rule in marital names, which in most states is to retain 
one’s existing name). 
  234 Erin Todd Bronchetti, et al, When a Nudge Isn’t Enough: Defaults and Saving 
among Low-Income Tax Filers *28–29 (NBER Working Paper 16887, Mar 2011), online 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16887 (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  235 Id. 
  236  See, for example, Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne, and David A. Horne, The 
Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure Intentions versus Behaviors, 41 J Con-
sumer Affairs 100, 118 (2007) (finding that people say they are willing to provide less 
personal information than they actually provide due partly to different perceptions of 
risk and trust when asked about intentions as compared to actual disclosure settings);  
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off the benefits that websites are likely to give them for opting out 
of a do-not-track default versus the privacy benefits of sticking 
with the default is likely to be challenging even if they under-
stand what information is collected and how it is used. For 
health insurance, consumers want both low prices and compre-
hensive coverage and find tradeoffs between the two difficult to 
make.237 In addition, people do not know what their health needs 
will be in the next year, meaning it is impossible to know which 
plan will cover their needs at the lowest price. Both health and 
privacy are “protected values,” such that people are averse to 
making tradeoffs against them and will resort to decision strat-
egies that avoid the subjective experience of such tradeoffs.238 
Given uncertain preferences in both domains, consumer deci-
sions can be heavily influenced by framing. Therefore, websites 
are likely to successfully defuse the power of a do-not-track de-
fault, and if they can obtain access to consumers choosing a 
health plan, competing health insurers are likely to successfully 
defuse the power of health-plan defaults. 
In sum, the conditions that make the overdraft default slip-
pery are not unique. Policy defaults are likely to be slippery 
when consumers find the decision context confusing and/or are 
uncertain about their preferences and firms have the means and 
the motivation to induce consumers to opt out.239 
 
James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy on the Internet, 41 J Consumer Affairs 351, 359 
(2007). 
  237 See Arthur Schram and Joep Sonnemans, How Individuals Choose Health In-
surance: An Experimental Analysis, 55 Eur Econ Rev 799, 804 (2011) (experimentally 
finding that people select health insurance policies by satisficing on one attribute at a 
time, rather than by making tradeoffs). 
  238  See Jonathan Baron and Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70 Org Beh & Human 
Dec Processes 1, 5–6 (1997). 
  239 This does not mean that the boundary conditions on policy defaults identified 
here are an exhaustive list. For example, where consumers perceive the default to have 
been selected by a party with opposing interests, they often opt out. See Christina L. 
Brown and Aradhna Krishna, The Skeptical Shopper: A Metacognitive Account for the 
Effects of Default Options on Choice, 31 J Consumer Rsrch 529, 537 (2004). Thus, if con-
sumers believe policymakers have set a policy default without consumers’ best interests 
in mind, they might reject it on that basis.   
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III.  CAN THE LAW MAKE DEFAULTS STICKY . . . BUT NOT TOO 
STICKY? 
A.  Policy Defaults Must Be Defaults 
Can policymakers ever use defaults as a policy tool to bene-
fit consumers who find the situation confusing and their own 
preferences uncertain when firms have a strong incentive to in-
duce consumers to opt out and those same firms have access to 
consumers at a time when those consumers can opt out? Can 
policy defaults be complemented with regulation that would 
overcome the boundary conditions identified above? As a rudi-
mentary step, policymakers must require that the policy default 
truly be a default. Rather than allowing firms to impose a man-
dated choice on consumers, the law must demand that firms 
format the decision-making environment so that inertia is an 
option and it leads to sticking with the default. To complement 
this altering rule, a framing rule is needed: firms must be pro-
hibited from creating the misimpression that the policy default 
is not a default. These steps would ensure that at least the min-
imal transaction cost of checking a box or saying “yes” to a firm 
representative favors the policy default. They would allow omis-
sion bias and procrastination mechanisms to bolster the default. 
And they would increase the likelihood that consumers will un-
derstand which position has been selected as the default, per-
haps conveying some implicit advice. 
The failure of banking regulators to enact and enforce these 
altering and framing rules—the rules that the policy default be 
a true default and that banks not do anything to create the im-
pression otherwise—with regards to overdraft reflects a lack of 
political will more than a flaw inherent in the use of policy de-
faults more broadly.240 But while such steps are a predicate for 
other measures that might make defaults stickier, these steps 
alone are unlikely to be effective. In the overdraft case, existing 
account holders who did not use online banking were placed in a 
true default position—they were not required to make any 
choice, and if they did nothing, they stuck with the default. 
Many consumers with a history of frequent overdrafts likely fell 
into this group, so their high opt-out rate cannot be attributed to 
being placed in a mandated-choice scenario. 
 
  240  I thank Professor Prentiss Cox for this point.  
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What else could policymakers do? First, they might enact al-
tering and framing rules that prevent firm maneuvers that 
make policy defaults slippery. Second, copying the tactics used 
by firms to bolster firm-set defaults, policymakers might turn to 
altering rules, framing rules, and affirmative government-
framing efforts that (1) create transaction barriers to opting out, 
(2) invoke judgment and decision biases that lead to sticking 
with the default, or (3) have the potential to shape consumer 
preferences to favor policy defaults.241 Given the ease with which 
banks have evaded the altering and framing rules intended to 
make the overdraft policy default work, these efforts would need 
to be significantly more extensive to be potent. 
However, establishing a web of altering rules, framing rules, 
and affirmative government framing to support policy defaults 
faces a number of challenges. First, the cost of monitoring, en-
forcing, and adapting such regulations to respond to evolving 
circumstances would be high. Second, both altering and framing 
rules can have effects more like traditional substantive regula-
tion.242 Although such substantive regulation is not per se prob-
lematic, it is at odds with the libertarian-paternalism premises 
behind the use of policy defaults rather than substantive regula-
tion in the first instance. Third, potent framing rules have the 
 
  241 Another response might be to add substantive regulation to protect those con-
sumers who opt out, both as a means of protecting these consumers and as an indirect 
way to make the default stickier by giving firms less incentive to encourage people to opt 
out. This is largely what consumer advocates are pressing in the context of overdraft, 
now that they see how slippery the default has been. See, for example, Center for Re-
sponsible Lending, Consumer Federation of America, and National Consumer Law Cen-
ter, Comments at *3–4 (cited in note 78) (advocating limits on the number of overdraft 
fees that can be charged, the size of the fees, the circumstances under which the fees can 
be charged, and so forth). But to the extent that substantive regulation transforms the 
opt-out position into one that is valuable for more consumers, the policy default may 
then be less helpful because it imposes costs on more people who would be better off in 
the now-improved opt-out position. As the opt-out position becomes more valuable to 
consumers, it will also provide less revenue to firms, and firms will therefore spend less 
effort encouraging consumers to opt out. See text accompanying notes 211–19 (explain-
ing why substantive protections for those who opt out of the over-the-limit fee default 
reduce credit card issuer incentives to encourage opting out). The result could be a policy 
default that is stickier even though fewer people ought to stick with it. Moreover, such 
substantive regulation is at odds with the soft paternalism billed by nudging proponents. 
  242 In this respect, policy defaults are no different than disclosure regulation for 
complex consumer products; disclosure can only make consumer markets function well 
when paired with substantive regulation limiting product complexity. See Lauren E. Wil-
lis,  Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: 
Price, 65 Md L Rev 707, 820–24 (2006) (proposing a combination of disclosure and sub-
stantive regulation so that the disclosure is useful for price shopping among home 
mortgages).   
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potential to run afoul of protections afforded to commercial 
speech by current Supreme Court doctrine. Fourth, some of the 
tools used by firms to bolster their own defaults pose ethical 
concerns, concerns that are heightened when it is the govern-
ment that is using these tools. Finally, to the extent that poli-
cymakers have chosen a default rather than a mandate due to a 
belief that some people are better off opting out of the default, 
they must worry about making a default too sticky. 
B.  Altering Rules (and Complementary Framing Rules) 
1.  Prohibit firms from treating consumers in the default 
position differently. 
To make policy defaults effective, the law must prohibit 
firms from creating barriers to sticking with the default or giv-
ing consumers incentives to opt out. For example, banks should 
not be permitted to offer a day of float or credit for uncleared de-
posits to those who opt out of the overdraft default but not to 
those who do not opt out. The effect of such a rule would be that 
banks would stop offering these perks altogether, because banks 
would otherwise risk that those who had not opted out would 
overdraw their accounts and fail to cover the overdraft with a 
same-day or uncleared deposit. If a do-not-track policy default is 
adopted and policymakers want it to be sticky, websites must be 
prohibited from conditioning use on opting out or giving perks to 
consumers who opt out.243 Again, such an altering rule could 
have substantive effects. For example, to the extent that track-
ing enables websites to provide content, content availability 
could decline for all users. Although nudgers advocate defaults 
on the grounds that they do not limit choice, making policy de-
faults sticky can require substantive regulation of the products 
and services firms offer, with choice-limiting effects. 
But requiring that firms give the same terms to consumers 
who do and do not opt out is not enough. Recall that nearly half 
of checking-account holders surveyed who had opted out of 
the overdraft default did so, at least in part, to be relieved of 
the onslaught of bank marketing.244 Firms’ marketing must be 
 
  243 But  see  Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change at *50–52 (cited 
in note 207) (explaining the FTC’s view that in some circumstances, it is acceptable for 
companies to condition use of their products or services on accepting tracking or to offer 
consumers who opt out lower prices or other benefits).  
  244  See note 148 and accompanying text.  
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evenhanded, meaning firms must either ask all consumers to opt 
out only once245 or continue to send the same advertising regardless 
of whether the consumer has already opted out. Micromanaging 
firm marketing behavior hardly seems the easy, low-cost, soft 
paternalism that nudgers have touted, but it may be necessary 
for policy defaults opposed by firms to be effective. Moreover, as 
addressed further below, controlling firm marketing could run 
afoul of the First Amendment. 
2.  Impose transaction barriers that impede opting out. 
Nudgers generally believe that opting out of policy defaults 
should be cheap and easy, but one tried-and-true way to make a 
default sticky is to impose transaction barriers on opting out. 
A simple transaction barrier would be a fee or tax that a 
consumer must pay to opt out of the policy default.246 Even a 
nominal fee would create the psychological recognition that opt-
ing out is not “free”; a larger fee could counter psychological dis-
counting of the costs of opting out. Nonfinancial opt-out transac-
tion costs are also possible.247 A time- or hassle-intensive 
procedure, such as completing a long questionnaire or waiting 
on hold to speak with a surly service representative, could be a 
prerequisite for opting out. Defaults could be “reverting,” mean-
ing that consumers would be required to opt out repeatedly—for 
example, before each transaction that would overdraw their 
checking accounts. “Train-and-test”248 altering rules are another 
option. These could entail attending a class or counseling session 
about the policy default or passing a test demonstrating under-
standing of the default as a precondition for opting out; the costs 
of each of these could deter opting out.249 
 
  245 There is some precedent for this. IRS regulations permit tax preparers to ask 
their customers to use their tax information for marketing purposes, but the request can 
only be made once. 26 CFR § 301.7216-3(b)(3).  
  246 See Ayres, 121 Yale L J at 2088–92 (cited in note 4) (suggesting government-
imposed fees for opting out of policy defaults). 
  247  Id at 2076.  
  248 See id at 2076–80 (discussing each of these types of barriers to opting out of de-
faults).  
  249 In theory, altering rules requiring classes, counseling, or testing would decrease 
consumer confusion, one of the background conditions that gives power to both defaults 
and firm framing that encourages opting out. However, in practice these may operate 
more as transaction barriers than as educative tools. When Illinois required some bor-
rowers to undergo prepurchase counseling for certain types of mortgages, transaction 
barriers, not increased borrower understanding of these mortgages, led to the decreased 
prevalence of these mortgages. See Sumit Agarwal, et al, Do Financial Counseling  
2013]  When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults 1215 
 
But imposing costs can be problematic, for four reasons. 
First, imposing costs can itself be a costly enterprise; collecting a 
tax, administering escrow accounts, or offering classes, counsel-
ing sessions, or tests would all require substantial resources. 
Second, imposing these costs on parties who opt out to their det-
riment harms the very consumers the policy default was estab-
lished to protect. Third, there is the overdeterrence problem. It 
would be difficult to calibrate a cost that would deter those who 
ought to stick with the default and not those who ought to opt 
out. For example, waiting on hold might disproportionately de-
ter consumers with little time or patience, yet these might be 
the very consumers who ought to opt out of the default. Fourth, 
firm maneuvers to minimize or neutralize opt-out costs can be 
expected. For example, to make opting out habitual, a bank 
might require account holders to check a box agreeing to opt out 
of the overdraft policy default “in the event that this transaction 
overdraws my account” every time they engage in an ATM or 
debit transaction.250 Requiring consumers to opt out of a do-not-
track default every time they visit a website similarly would no 
doubt lead firms to create opt-out buttons that consumers could 
click without thinking.251 
Instead of imposing costs as a transaction barrier, the gov-
ernment might try to create confusion or harness the invisibility 
mechanism.252 For example, the government could strive to make 
the opt-out procedure confusing. But such a system would be 
costly, for the government to intentionally confuse its own citi-
zens is unethical, and ultimately firms would take steps to 
“help” consumers overcome any confusion and successfully opt 
 
Mandates Improve Mortgage Choice and Performance? Evidence from a Legislative Ex-
periment *31–32 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper No 2009-07, Oct 
2009), online at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers 
/2009/wp2009_07.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013).  
  250  Given the current processing time for deposits and debits, banks might reasona-
bly maintain that at the very moment the consumer uses the debit card or ATM, the 
bank cannot be certain whether the transaction will overdraw the account. See Govern-
ment Accountability Office, Bank Fees at *54–66 (cited in note 149) (explaining barriers 
that prevent banks from disclosing to consumers that they are about to overdraw their 
accounts on a transaction-by-transaction basis). 
  251 See  Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change at *49 (cited in note 
207) (noting a “choice ‘fatigue’” problem when web users are repeatedly asked to opt out); 
Ayres, 121 Yale L J at 2069 (cited in note 4) (noting the problem that some altering rules 
are ineffective because people become “habituated to the speed bumps”). 
  252 See, for example, Ayres, 121 Yale L J at 2080–83 (cited in note 4) (discussing 
“password” altering rules, which require parties to be sufficiently sophisticated about the 
transaction or the law to know the password required to opt out of policy defaults).  
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out.253 Invisibility of the opt-out option could only be achieved by 
prohibiting firms from making consumers aware of it.254 In addi-
tion to being unethical, this would violate the First Amendment, 
as explained further below. A final issue is, again, overdeter-
rence—if the ability to opt out is truly invisible, those who ought 
to opt out will not. 
3.  Require consumers to spend time in the default position. 
Requiring consumers to spend some time in the default po-
sition might increase the stickiness of defaults through loss 
aversion, the endowment effect, and the preference-shaping ef-
fects of experience. Experiencing the default might also educate 
consumers about their choices and preferences, thus mitigating 
the background conditions that facilitate the operation of mech-
anisms that can make defaults slippery. As noted above, this is 
already the law with regards to tax and insurance escrows for 
most high-cost mortgages; borrowers must escrow these with the 
lender for one year before opting out.255 In the case of overdraft, 
consumers who remain in the default position for some time 
might find that delaying purchases until they obtain more funds 
is not so onerous and is less costly than overdraft fees. While in 
the default position, they also might overcome any inertia or 
mistaken beliefs about their own overdraft usage that could 
have otherwise stood in the way of setting up a less expensive 
overdraft plan. 
How long must consumers spend in the default position to 
better understand their choices and preferences and for loss 
aversion, the endowment effect, and the preference-shaping ef-
fects of experience to kick in? At a minimum, consumers would 
need to experience the default position at a time when it has 
some relevance to their lives.256 To provide experiential lessons 
that require behavior change, such as living without overdraft 
 
  253 Consider Gamers Opt Out, online at http://www.gamersoptout.com (visited Sept 
11, 2013) (assisting video game players to opt out of firm-set defaults that waive the civil 
justice defaults, including class action waivers, arbitration clauses, and so forth). 
  254  This is a framing rule rather than an altering rule, but I discuss it here as it is a 
transaction barrier akin to imposing costs or confusion. 
  255  12 CFR § 226.35(b)(iii). 
  256 The privacy benefits of a do-not-track default are unlikely to be appreciated 
through experiencing the default. Instead, users would need to experience some undesir-
able privacy cost and compare it to the benefits they have received from tracking. Yet by 
the time this cost has been incurred, information about the user has already been 
collected.   
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coverage, could require many months in the default position.257 
For a default health insurance plan, the consumer must use the 
plan through various medical needs before she can understand 
how its coverage and cost provisions will affect her, a process 
that might take years. Yet requiring consumers to stay in any 
particular position for very long seems closer to hard paternal-
ism than the soft paternalism that nudgers claim will be effec-
tive on its own, and harms those who are better off outside the 
default. 
4.  Delay the benefits and expedite contemplation of the 
costs of opting out. 
Another possibility would be an altering rule that placed a 
delay between the decision to opt out of the policy default and 
gains to the consumer from opting out, and a complementary 
framing rule that conveyed the existence and extent of any loss-
es caused by opting out prior to finalizing the consumer’s deci-
sion to opt out. By making the consumer contemplate the costs 
immediately and experience the benefits later, discounting could 
not be used to induce consumers to opt out (and instead these 
biases might support the default). One industry consultant has 
opined that if consumers were warned of the fee they were about 
to be charged each time they attempted to overdraw their ac-
counts, so few consumers would overdraw that it would “effec-
tively kill overdraft services.”258 In a context such as internet-use 
tracking, where a single decision to opt out has effects over time, 
the consumer might be notified of the uses to which her data will 
be put each time she attempted to visit a new website and given 
the opportunity to reconsider whether she wants to visit that 
website. 
However, delaying the benefits and expediting contempla-
tion of the costs of opting out pose three problems. First, they 
could impose significant costs on consumers. Delay could harm 
consumers who have an immediate need for the benefits of 
 
  257 A study in Australia, where for three years after filing for bankruptcy debtors 
cannot obtain credit of any kind, found that debtors improved their cash management 
strategies significantly during this period. Further, most debtors believed the reality of 
lacking access to credit did not sink in and alter their behavior until six to twelve 
months into the experience. See Martin Ryan, The Last Resort: A Study of Consumer 
Bankrupts 247 (Avebury 1995). 
  258  Lieber and Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards, NY Times at A20 (cited in note 
77) (reporting the opinion of Michael Moeb).  
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opting out. For frequently repeated transactions, such as visit-
ing a website, notifying a consumer about the privacy losses she 
is about to incur every time she navigates to a new website could 
impose significant costs; clearing her screen of a notification 
might take only a few seconds, but time spent reading the notic-
es could amount to many weeks over a lifetime of internet use.259 
Second, these notices are likely to be useful for only a short 
while, until the consumer becomes habituated and ignores them. 
Third, these rules could effectively amount to substantive regu-
lation. For firms to tell consumers upfront the costs that con-
sumers will incur would require firms to limit the costs of opting 
out to those costs that the firm can know with certainty at the 
time the consumer opts out. For example, banks could not 
charge a “sustained overdraft” fee because this would not be cer-
tain at the time the rule required the cost disclosure to be made. 
Firms that track consumer web use would be required to limit 
their future use of consumer data to those uses the firm dis-
closed at the time the consumer navigated to the website, even if 
future technology or market conditions create new uses for the 
data. These substantive constraints might be good policy, but 
they go well beyond setting a default. 
5.  Interpose an intermediary. 
Instead of firms implementing policy defaults through direct 
interaction with consumers, the law might interpose an inter-
mediary. The intermediary could ensure that the consumer in-
tended to opt out, incidentally impose transaction costs that 
would deter opting out and delay that might counter time dis-
counting, and, more ambitiously, counteract effects of firm mar-
keting by engaging in educational efforts to ensure an informed 
opt-out decision. 
For example, rather than having firms run the opt-out sys-
tem, the government could run it in a manner inverse to the Do 
Not Call registry.260 In the case of a do-not-track default, 
 
  259 See Aleecia M. McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy 
Policies, 4 I/S: J L & Pol Info Socy 540, 560 & table 7 (2008) (estimating based on 2008 
data that, if consumers read the privacy policies of each website they visited, the average 
annual time spent doing so would be 244 hours, or more than half of the time consumers 
spend on average using the internet each year). 
  260 See National Do Not Call Registry, online at http://www.donotcall.gov (visited 
Sept 11, 2013) (allowing individuals to place their phone numbers on a list of numbers 
telemarketers are prohibited from calling).  
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websites would be barred from tracking consumer internet 
use unless the consumer had signed up for the “Track Me” reg-
istry. However, while a government opt-out registry would not 
be expensive, enforcing its use—ferreting out which firms had 
tracked internet use by consumers who were not in the registry, 
for example—could be extremely costly.261 Further, firms will no 
doubt helpfully transport consumers’ computer screens to the 
“Track Me” website or offer to opt out on consumers’ behalves, 
eliminating the costs and procrastination that might otherwise 
impede opting out.262 Firm marketing could continue to play on 
judgment and decision biases as well. Although the government 
could engage in its own framing efforts on the opt-out registry 
website, the government is not particularly adept at marketing. 
Going further, a consumer might be required to consult with 
an expert as a prerequisite for opting out. The costs of this, the 
delay it would occasion, and potential educative effects might 
successfully deter opting out, similar to requiring attendance at 
a class or counseling session discussed above.263 But the expense 
and overdeterrence problems of requiring a class or counseling 
likewise plague an expert-consultation requirement. 
Intermediary systems could also have substantive effects 
due to their wholesale nature. Realistically, an intermediary 
could only be used in contexts in which the consumer makes a 
single opt-out decision with broad effects. For example, a Track 
Me registry could facilitate a consumer choice that would allow 
all websites to track her for all purposes, but such a registry 
probably could not accommodate consumers who wanted to opt 
out of tracking by some websites, or for some purposes, but not 
others. The effect would be to substantively prevent consumers 
from making more fine-grained opt-out decisions.264 
 
  261  Tracking technology can now avoid leaving any trace on the user’s computer. See 
Peter Eckersley, How Unique Is Your Web Browser?, in Mikhail J. Atallah and Nicholas 
J. Hopper, eds, Privacy Enchancing Technologies 1, 3 (Springer 2010) (explaining a 
tracking system that is effective even when a user has deleted cookies and that “leaves 
no persistent evidence of tagging on the user’s computer”). 
  262 Note that telemarketers do not have this ability; they cannot call consumers to 
ask them to opt out of the Do Not Call registry, and while they could ask by mail, they 
cannot instantly transport consumers to a Do Not Call website to facilitate opting out. 
  263  See note 249 and accompanying text. 
  264 A web browser might seem to be an intermediary that could facilitate fine-
grained opt-out choices. But see note 218 (explaining that browsers cannot prevent 
tracking). But the more fine-grained the choices presented, the more difficult the deci-
sion process becomes, making consumers more vulnerable to confusion and firm framing 
encouraging consumers to opt out.  
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C.  Controls on Firm Framing 
1.  Prohibit firm manipulation of judgment and decision 
biases. 
Instead of using altering rules to direct biases to bolster the 
default, policymakers might turn to a broad framing rule that 
outlaws firm maneuvers that harness these biases to work 
against policy defaults. However, testing all marketing for its 
potential to trigger judgment and decision biases would be an 
overwhelming task for regulators, not the easy, low-cost policy 
fix portrayed by nudgers. 
Moreover, controls on firm marketing are likely to run afoul 
of First Amendment doctrine. Under that doctrine, any govern-
mental restriction on commercial speech must (1) “directly ad-
vance” a substantial governmental interest and (2) be “narrowly 
tailored” to serve that interest.265 To meet the first part of this 
test, the government must demonstrate that such speech causes 
harm and that the regulation’s restriction on speech will allevi-
ate the harm “to a material degree.”266 To meet the second part, 
the restriction must not burden substantially more speech than 
necessary to alleviate the harm.267 The chain of inference from 
any particular firm framing manipulation to a consumer’s deci-
sion to opt out to that consumer being harmed is likely too long 
to meet the “directly advance” test. For example, firm framing of 
the policy default as a loss and of opting out as keeping an en-
dowed position might lead some consumers to opt out, but this 
framing is unlikely to be their only reason for opting out, and 
therefore eliminating this marketing pitch would not necessarily 
lead consumers to stick with the default. Further, given that 
policymakers have chosen to use a policy default rather than a 
mandate or ban, the government must believe that some con-
sumers are better off opting out, yet speech that might encour-
age them to do so could be curtailed by a rule controlling firm 
marketing. Because the restrictions on speech will affect both 
those who might benefit from it and those who might be harmed 
by it, these restrictions are likely too broad to meet the “narrow 
tailoring” test. 
 
  265  Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York, 
447 US 557, 564 (1980).  
  266  Edenfield v Fane, 507 US 761, 770–71 (1993). 
  267 See International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc v Lee, 505 US 672, 707 
(1992) (Kennedy concurring).  
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Rather than prohibiting firm speech that manipulates bias-
es, regulators might instead attempt to require firms to engage 
in more speech, speech that would pivot biases back towards the 
policy default. Unless the regulation chills protected speech or is 
unduly burdensome, compelled commercial speech needs only to 
be “reasonably related” to the government interest advanced.268 
But developing warnings, disclaimers, or other language to 
counter every framing manipulation used by firms would be a 
never-ending regulatory project. Moreover, such mandated lan-
guage is likely to be relevant only at the margins, if it is helpful 
at all.269 For example, despite the oft-repeated line that “past 
performance is no guarantee of future results,” consumers stub-
bornly chase returns in their investment decisions.270 Requiring 
firms to add content to their marketing that goes beyond warn-
ings or factual information, such as the Food and Drug Admin-
istration is currently attempting to do with graphic reminders of 
health dangers on tobacco product packaging—while potentially 
much more effective than dry text—is likely to be found uncon-
stitutional.271 
As Professor David Yosifon has cogently explained, First 
Amendment doctrine is centrally premised on a rational actor 
model in which more information, however it is framed, is either 
helpful or, at worst, irrelevant to good decision making.272 It is 
 
  268 Zauderer v Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 US 
626, 651 (1985). 
  269 See Kesten C. Green and J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Manda-
tory Disclaimers in Advertising, 31 J Pub Pol & Mktg 293, 297 (2012) (reviewing past 
experimental studies of the effects of mandatory disclaimers and finding that all such 
disclaimers increased consumer confusion and most were ineffective or led consumers to 
make worse decisions).  
  270  See, for example, Molly Mercer, Alan R. Palmiter, and Ahmed E. Taha, Worthless 
Warnings? Testing the Effectiveness of Disclaimers in Mutual Fund Advertisements, 7 J 
Empirical Legal Stud 429, 433–34 (2010).  
  271 Compare  Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc v United States, 674 F3d 509, 518 
(6th Cir 2012) (holding graphic tobacco warnings constitutional), with RJ Reynolds To-
bacco Co v Food & Drug Administration, 696 F3d 1205, 1221–22 (DC Cir 2012) (holding 
the same warnings unconstitutional). The Supreme Court will likely hold the graphic 
tobacco warnings unconstitutional. Consider Borgner v Florida Board of Dentistry, 537 
US 1080, 1082 (2002) (Thomas dissenting from denial of certiorari) (suggesting that 
compelled commercial speech must “directly advance[ ]” the government’s interest to sur-
vive First Amendment scrutiny, not merely bear some reasonable relationship to the 
government’s interest); United States v United Foods, Inc, 533 US 405, 416 (2001) (indi-
cating that the “reasonably related” test for compelled commercial speech only applies 
when that speech is necessary to make commercial speech “nonmisleading”).  
  272 David G. Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture: The Commercial Speech Doctrine and 
Junk-Food Advertising to Children, 39 Loyola LA L Rev 507, 552–55 (2006). This is not 
to say that the First Amendment commercial speech doctrine could not be reconceived,  
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therefore on a collision course with government regulation prem-
ised on a human judgment and decision bias model in which 
more information or particular framings of information can im-
pede good decision making. 
2.  Simplify and clarify the decision environment. 
Instead of broad prohibitions, policymakers might change 
the background conditions that facilitate the operation of mech-
anisms that can make defaults slippery by simplifying and clari-
fying the decision environment consumers face. 
To simplify the situation, when consumers have other choic-
es that they might confuse with the policy default, firms might 
be required (1) to offer a standardized, limited menu of these 
choices and (2) to use a standardized set of terms to describe 
those choices. For example, banks might be required to offer a 
small set of simple products that allow consumers to overdraw 
their accounts, and to use only distinct, standardized terms to 
refer to these products. But such strict framing rules would sub-
stantially limit the products that firms can offer. Again, the les-
son is that to make defaults work in a complex choice environ-
ment requires hard product regulation to simplify that 
environment. In addition, requiring firms to use one set of terms 
and only one set of terms to refer to or explain a product likely 
runs afoul of both the “directly advance” and “narrow tailoring” 
requirements of the First Amendment, the former because it is 
not clear that such a set of standardized terms would prevent 
consumer confusion, and the latter because other terms could be 
used in a way that is not confusing. 
To clarify rather than simplify, firms might be permitted to 
offer whatever options they choose, but also be required to pre-
sent those choices in a standardized menu format that consum-
ers could use to make both the choice whether to opt out of the 
default and the choice of which alternative(s) to the default to 
take. The PEW Charitable Trusts has made a similar suggestion 
in the overdraft area, proposing that banks be required to pre-
sent consumers with a chart that lists overdraft product options 
and their key features.273 A menu might better guide consumers 
 
see id at 560–83, but unlike Professor Yosifon, I do not believe that it is on the visible 
horizon of American courts’ jurisprudence.  
  273  Weinstock, et al, Still Risky at *19 (cited in note 118). Note, however, that PEW 
envisions this as a separate informational document rather than as a document that 
could be physically check marked or electronically clicked by consumers to select among  
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to the correct end positions than a policy default alone because 
consumers who read and understand the entire menu are more 
likely to make their opt-out decision based on full and accurate 
information. However, this presentation also might highlight 
the tradeoffs that must be made among the choices, thus making 
the decision more difficult, potentially leading to greater pro-
crastination and, therefore, reliance on the default. 
Requiring firms to present the opt-out choice as part of a 
menu of related choices, however, poses (1) administrative chal-
lenges for the law and (2) opportunities for firm framing manip-
ulations. As to the former, it is difficult for the law to define 
which choices are sufficiently related that they all must appear 
in the menu. For example, should borrowing on a credit card or 
payday advance lending be on the same menu as overdraft 
choices, given that all are means of accessing short-term credit? 
Regarding the latter, abundant research indicates that changing 
the options in a menu can change consumer choices. Although 
adding too many options can make a default stickier due to the 
increased difficulty of selecting among options, other manipula-
tions can make a default slippery. For example, adding options 
that appear to represent a range can increase selection of the 
middle option (the “compromise” effect), and adding an option 
that is similar but obviously inferior to another choice in the set 
increases the selection of the superior option (the “asymmetric 
dominance” or “attraction” effect).274 Firms could encourage opt-
ing out by adding or subtracting options such that the policy de-
fault is never the compromise option or the asymmetrically dom-
inated option. For example, in the face of a “do not track, use, or 
share my information” policy default option A, firms could easily 
add options B—“track and use my information, but do not share 
it with any other entity”—and C—“track, use and share my in-
formation with anyone.” Option B would then be the compromise 
choice and the policy default (option A) could become slippery.275 
 
overdraft coverage options. In addition, the PEW disclosure would require substantive 
changes in the law that would constrain the choices banks could offer to consumers (the 
PEW disclosure collapses overdrafts occasioned by ATM, nonrecurring debit, check, and 
recurring payment transactions into a single treatment) and the pricing structure used 
by banks for those choices (the PEW disclosure presents all costs as flat fees).  
  274 See, for example, Itamar Simonson, Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of At-
traction and Compromise Effects, 16 J Consumer Rsrch 158, 160–62 (1989).  
  275  In reality, the menu of choices for internet tracking are likely to be considerably 
more extensive and complex, given the possible permutations (allowing tracking for some 
types of information but not others, for some uses but not others, by some parties but not  
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D.  Affirmative Government Framing 
Instead of trying to control firm framing, the government 
might avoid First Amendment concerns by jumping into the 
frame game directly. For the government to play on people’s 
judgment and decision biases might raise ethical concerns, but 
the government’s use of policy defaults already implies a deci-
sion that manipulation of these biases is an acceptable means of 
achieving policy ends. 
1.  Leverage the opt-out form. 
Provided that firms were required to use a prescribed opt-
out form,276 much could be done to formulate that form to invoke 
biases that support the policy default. To harness omission bias, 
loss aversion, and procrastination, the form could make clear 
that inertia is an option, portray the default as an endowed posi-
tion, and warn consumers that they will be responsible for the 
effects if they opt out. The form might list the benefits of stick-
ing with the policy default prominently, both to explicitly advise 
consumers to stick with the default and to attempt to invoke the 
operation of query effects to favor the default. It could explain 
that the default has been selected by policymakers with con-
sumers’ interests in mind, to further convey advice. 
However, the effectiveness of all of this hinges on consumers 
reading the form and making their opt-out decision based on the 
form rather than based on firm marketing. Experience with oth-
er mandated disclosures cautions that consumers rarely read 
them, and even when they do, they do not understand them or 
use the information in them accurately.277 Firm marketing is 
likely to reach consumers long before they see the government 
form, and by the time they see the form, they may have already 
made their decision based on that marketing.278 When sufficient-
ly profitable to do so, firms can advise consumers in face-to-face, 
one-on-one meetings, and personal contact of this sort can be far 
 
others, etc.). And the more complex the choice set, the more opportunities for framing 
manipulations. 
  276 Note that this is not the case for the overdraft opt-out form. See 12 CFR 
§ 205.17(d) (requiring that financial institutions use forms “substantially similar” to the 
model form, though without providing the exact form that must be used). 
  277 See, for example, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Man-
dated Disclosure, 159 U Pa L Rev 647, 709–29 (2011) (explaining why consumers do not 
read, understand, or use disclosures). 
  278  See Willis, 65 Md L Rev at 791–93 (cited in note 242).  
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more influential than a written form.279 As one mortgage sales-
man testified while explaining how he convinced people to take 
out unaffordable home loans despite legally required mortgage 
disclosures, “It is written in simple English, and it is on all the 
loan documents, but I can get around any figure on any loan 
sheet.”280 
2.  Engage in government marketing. 
More directly, the government could explicitly advise con-
sumers to stick with the policy default. Public information cam-
paigns telling people to “Just say no” to opting out are clearly 
constitutional. 
However, the effectiveness of public information campaigns 
depends on the message being persuasive, simple, clear, and 
achievable.281 Campaigns promoting policy defaults are unlikely 
to be effective for two reasons: (1) firms can muddy the message 
and (2) the presence of some consumers who ought to opt out re-
quires the government to muddy the message. Firms can ob-
scure the default position and how to stay there, preventing con-
sumers from correctly applying the lesson of the campaign when 
they encounter the default. For example, a consumer taught to 
“just say ‘no’ to overdraft” might decline an overdraft-linked sav-
ings account but agree to “account protector”282 or one of the 
myriad of other names that banks use for the product that opts 
the consumer out of the default. At the same time, the very rea-
son regulators have chosen to use a default rather than a man-
date is because they believe some consumers are better off opt-
ing out. But “Most people should just say ‘no’” is neither 
persuasive nor clear. Consumers who self-select out of the “most 
people” group that ought to stick with the default might not be 
the demographic that ought to opt out. Although the message 
might go on to explain to consumers how to identify whether 
they ought to stick with the policy default or not, such instruc-
tions are not simple, nor are they likely to be clear. 
 
  279  See id at 798–804. 
  280  Equity Predators: Stripping, Flipping and Packing Their Way to Profits; Hearing 
before the Special Committee on Aging, 105th Cong, 2d Sess 30–37 (1998) (statement of 
“Jim Dough,” former employee of a predatory lender, testifying anonymously). 
  281  See Jessica Aschemann-Witzel, et al, Lessons for Public Health Campaigns from 
Analysing Commercial Food Marketing Success Factors: A Case Study *9 (BioMed Cen-
tral Public Health 2012), online at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2458 
-12-139.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
  282 See  Standard Overdraft Service: Are You In? (cited in note 121).  
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Even persuasive, simple, clear, and achievable public infor-
mation campaigns may fail when outmaneuvered by firms. 
Firms are more experienced and adept at marketing than the 
government, and they can fine-tune their messages to different 
demographics and over time in ways that the government has 
difficulty doing. Although regulators might require firms to pro-
vide consumers with a government document advocating the pol-
icy default, firms can surround those forms with marketing that 
sends a very different message. If the government’s message is 
muddled or complex, firms are handed an even better opportuni-
ty to confuse consumers. The effectiveness of a public education 
campaign endorsing a policy default is therefore likely to be 
minimal in the face of firm marketing favoring the opt-out posi-
tion and firm behavior designed to minimize the influence of the 
government’s message.283 
CONCLUSION 
When there is little opposition to a nudge, or the opposition 
that exists lacks the means to counter the nudge, nudges are 
likely to be successful in shaping citizens’ behaviors in socially 
optimal ways. This is likely to be the case in transactions be-
tween citizens and the government.284 Therefore, at least where 
mandated choice is impracticable, the government should exam-
ine whether the current default position is the right one. Pre-
sumed consent to organ donation is a prime example.285 Some 
organized religious groups might oppose organ donation, but 
they would not be the parties that implement the opt-out pro-
cess and thus would have little ability to frame the default in 
ways that could undermine the mechanisms that would make it 
stick. Some citizens may prefer not to donate, and their con-
scious preferences could be influenced by organized groups, but 
they are precisely the citizens who ought to opt out of a pre-
sumed-consent policy default. Provided that the government 
 
  283  See Theresa M. Marteau, et al, Judging Nudging: Can Nudging Improve Popula-
tion Health?, 342 Brit Med J 263, 265 (2011) (“Without regulation to limit the potent ef-
fects of unhealthy nudges in existing environments shaped largely by industry, nudging 
towards healthier behaviour may struggle to make much impression.”). 
  284  This is not universally true. When government actors with access to affected citi-
zens oppose a policy default, that default will be slippery. For example, although silence 
is the default, arrestees, even after receiving information about their right to remain si-
lent, almost universally opt out and talk. I thank Eric Miller for this example. 
  285  See generally Eric J. Johnson and Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 
Science 1338 (2003).  
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does not place transaction barriers in the way of opting out, 
these citizens will do so. But for the many citizens who would ei-
ther prefer to donate or whose feelings about the matter are un-
decided or sufficiently conflicted, a presumed-consent default 
would increase the number of donors and society as a whole 
would benefit. 
Not so when firms with the power to shape the frame sur-
rounding the nudge oppose it. Under these conditions, nudges 
are not the easy, low-cost, effective-without-constraining-choice 
policy option that nudgers have advertised. Instead, they may 
provide political cover for policymakers who want to appear to 
protect consumers, without actually helping those who need the 
most help. 
This does not mean that opposed nudges have no benefits. 
For example, where consumers were not previously given or 
aware of the default position as an option, policy defaults can 
expand consumer choices and broaden consumers’ consideration 
sets, just as mandated-choice regimes do. But the benefits are 
not of the magnitude envisioned by those who find inspiration in 
the stickiness of the retirement savings plan-participation de-
fault. 
The nudgers realize that the frame in which a choice is per-
ceived matters, but then focus on far too narrow a frame in de-
signing policy to take advantage of this insight.286 They review 
the results obtained from changing a particular aspect of fram-
ing in one context and conclude that changing the same aspect 
in another context will lead to similar results. But in the real 
world, every context is different, often in consequential ways. 
Sometimes nudges will be effective, but for the reasons this Ar-
ticle explains, they often will not be. 
In offering policy prescriptions, nudgers also assume a static 
world—one where regulation can switch the default rule, pro-
vide consumers with information, or frame information in a par-
ticular manner while everything else stays the same. But when 
 
  286  See Kyle Powys Whyte, et al, Nudge, Nudge or Shove, Shove—The Right Way for 
Nudges to Increase the Supply of Donated Cadaver Organs, 12 Am J Bioethics 32, 36 
(Feb 2012) (explaining that nudgers need to be more sensitive to the context in which the 
nudge is executed, as this context will determine the success of the nudge); Tom Baker 
and Timothy D. Lytton, Allowing Patients to Waive the Right to Sue for Medical Mal-
practice: A Response to Thaler and Sunstein, 104 Nw U L Rev 233, 239–40 (2010) (argu-
ing that making nonwaiver of the right to sue for medical malpractice the default would 
not prevent healthcare providers from exploiting patients’ cognitive biases to convince 
patients to opt out).  
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firms oppose nudges, they respond to the change dynamically.287 
Policy defaults prevent firms from setting the default them-
selves, removing one arrow from firms’ quivers, but not all. 
Providing consumers with information means firms can no long-
er keep consumers in the dark, but the effects of persuasive 
marketing can swamp the effects of information. Reframing in-
formation so that consumers are likely to make choices that in-
crease their own or societal welfare at the expense of the firms 
offering those choices can only occur when consumers read the 
reframed information, understand it, and base their decisions 
upon it rather than upon firm marketing. Choice architecture is 
powerful if you are the one designing it. The difficulty is for the 
law to design it—the actual designers are often firms selling 
products or services to consumers, and they can run circles 
around the law. 
This does not mean that firms are indifferent to the nudges 
they oppose. Firms spend money and political capital opposing 
policy defaults and other nudges set to serve consumer or social 
interests that are not aligned with their own.288 Firms incur ex-
penses in manipulating the frame in which they present the pol-
icy defaults they oppose so as to defuse these defaults. Success-
ful marketing to consumers with ready access to information 
that could discourage sales is more expensive than marketing to 
consumers without easy access to this information. 
Firms will incur these costs only selectively. They will work 
to encourage consumers to opt out of policy defaults when the 
benefits they receive from the consumers who opt out are great-
er than the costs of making the default slippery for those con-
sumers. But the situations in which firms benefit most from 
consumers opting out are likely to occur precisely when the cost 
to the consumer of opting out is high. Recall that in their cam-
paign to move consumers to the opt-out position with respect to 
overdraft, banks targeted their resources at those consumers 
 
  287  See Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir, Behaviorally Informed at *2–3 (cited in note 
21) (explaining the need for regulators to take into account firm responses to behavior-
ally-informed policymaking—that is, nudges). 
  288  See, for example, Wyatt Buchanan, Social-Networking Sites Face New Privacy 
Battle, SFGate (San Francisco Chronicle May 14, 2011), online at http://www.sfgate.com 
/bayarea/article/Social-networking-sites-face-new-privacy-battle-2371641.php (visited 
Sept 11, 2013) (reporting on a social networking site lobbying against the internet-
privacy policy default); Stacy Kaper, Overdraft Bill Held Up as Rhetoric Heats Up; Spon-
sors See Some Room for Compromise as Both Sides Dig In, 172 Am Banker 1 (Sept 27, 
2007) (reporting on banking industry opposition to the overdraft policy default).  
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who were most likely to overdraft, those who both create the 
most overdraft revenue for banks and would most benefit by 
sticking with the policy default. Ironically then, nudges could 
help some consumers without helping those consumers most in 
need of help. The cost to firms of countering nudges might even 
be concentrated on those same consumers, decreasing net social 
welfare.289 
To leave society better off, nudges faced with firm opposition 
must be supported by a web of regulation and government mar-
keting so strong that the cost of cutting through that web ex-
ceeds the benefits to firms of doing so. Changing the default is 
not enough; regulation must also control the framing of the de-
fault and the opt-out process. But given First Amendment con-
straints on regulating framing by firms, policymakers are left 
with few options. They could try to counter firm speech with 
more speech, but the government generally loses marketing 
wars. They could enact quite substantive regulation to support 
the nudge. But then, why nudge? When firms oppose nudges, 
substantive regulation aimed directly at placing consumers in 
welfare-enhancing positions will certainly be more transparent, 
and it is likely to be more effective and less costly as well. 
 
  289 Professor David Laibson has explained how another tool advocated by nudgers, 
RECAP, could benefit sophisticated consumers at the expense of unsophisticated con-
sumers. RECAP would allow consumers to take their past use history of a service and 
input the data into a computer tool, which then obtains complex pricing information 
from available service providers, analyzes the consumer’s expected cost of buying the 
service from the providers, and tells consumers which provider is likely to be the least 
expensive for their use pattern. See Emir Kamenica, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Richard 
Thaler, Helping Consumers Know Themselves, 101 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proc 417, 
417–18 (2011). As Professor Laibson has detailed, RECAP enables firms to price discrim-
inate in a new way. Firms can offer generally high-priced products with a few good deals 
hidden among their offerings. Sophisticated consumers will find those good deals using 
the RECAP tools. Unsophisticated consumers are unlikely to use the RECAP tools and 
thus unlikely to find the good deals. Sophisticated consumers might make smarter choic-
es due to RECAP. But firms might recoup their losses from sophisticated consumer 
choices by raising prices on services sold to unsophisticated consumers. These ideas were 
expressed in David Laibson’s comments on Kamenica, Mullainathan, and Thaler’s paper 
at the American Economics Association Annual Meeting in 2011.  